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Independent Interpretation of the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of
Rights: A More Open and Traditional Approach to Asserting Rights

Nathan Yanchek*
The legislation now before us would probably not cause more
than ordinary anxiety, or deserve greater consideration than
the ordinary constitutional question, were it not for the times
in which we live, the depression now existing, the unrest now
prevailing, the mass of social legislation in the last few years, the
wonder whither we are going, and the frequent queries whether
courts are drifting merely with the tide or are rendering their
decisions with that steadfast judgment as is their wont.1
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I. Introduction
From the 1980s to today, the Wyoming Supreme Court has frequently
expressed a willingness to interpret the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration
of Rights independently from federal precedent interpreting the Federal Bill of
Rights.2 The goal of such interpretation has been to develop a new tradition
of independent state constitutional analysis.3 Early in its history, the Wyoming
Supreme Court established traditional methods of constitutional interpretation
which it applied to the rights provisions within the state constitution.4 In doing
so, the Court’s rulings occasionally led to outcomes which provided greater
protections than those the Federal Constitution afforded.5
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s tradition of independent analysis diminished
over time as the U.S. Supreme Court expanded civil rights protections under
the Federal Constitution.6 However, by the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court
began limiting its expansion of rights, and, as a result, a resurgent interest in
state constitutional law took hold as more litigants began arguing for greater
rights protections under their state constitutions.7 Initially, many state courts
were skeptical of this resurgence and questioned the legitimacy of using the state
constitution to deviate from federal precedent.8 Some of these skeptical state courts
adopted the neutral criteria approach in an effort to limit state constitutional

Robert B. Keiter, The Wyoming State Constitution 31, 46–47 (G. Alan Tarr eds.,
2d ed. 2017); see also Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 830, 836 (Wyo. 2019). The
Declaration of Rights is Wyoming’s analogue to the Federal Bill of Rights. Compare Wyo. Const.
art. 1, with U.S. Const. amends. I–X.
2

3
Keiter, supra note 2, at 46–47; see also Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 624 (Wyo. 1993)
(Golden, J., concurring).
4
See infra notes 64– 89 and accompanying text; see also Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial
Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶¶ 41, 47–49, 390 P.3d 728, 742, 744 (Wyo. 2017) (citing
Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 39, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065 (Wyo. 2004)); Cathcart, 2004
WY ¶¶ 39–40, 88 P.3d at 1065–66 (discussing traditional interpretational methods as applied
to the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights). See generally Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P.
819 (Wyo. 1897) (discussing interpretation of the Wyoming Constitution through principles of
statutory construction).
5
See State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920); Maki v. State, 112 P. 334 (Wyo. 1911). For
example, the early Wyoming Supreme Court “adopted the equivalent to Miranda rights and the
exclusionary rule more than fifty years before the federal judiciary followed suit.” Keiter, supra note
2, at 53 (citing Maki, 112 P. 334; Peterson, 194 P. 342).

See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483–84 (Wyo. 1999) (noting the decline in Wyoming’s
independent search and seizure analysis between the 1920’s and 1930’s); Keiter, supra note 2, at
31 n.100.
6

7
Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions 113–14 (2009); see
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
489, 490–91 (1977).
8

Williams, supra note 7, at 138.
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claims.9 The neutral criteria approach attempts to provide litigants with a
sufficient analytical framework, based on objective neutral criteria, to convince
a court to “resort” to their state constitution as a source for applying civil rights
protections.10 Throughout the 1990s, the Wyoming Supreme Court debated how
to address the resurgent push for independent constitutional analysis, eventually
adopting the neutral criteria approach as a “precise, analytically sound” form of
argument litigants can use to raise a state constitutional claim.11
From its adoption of the neutral criteria approach to present day, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has more actively sought to develop independent state
constitutional law.12 Despite its willingness to do so, the Court routinely rejects
state constitutional claims, in part, because litigants’ briefs fail to adhere to the
Court’s preferred analytical form.13 The Court frequently finds a litigant “has
not provided ‘well founded legal reasons’ justifying resort to independent state
grounds.”14 Ultimately, because of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s insistence on a
precise analytical form and its use of the neutral criteria approach, it has failed to
develop truly independent constitutional jurisprudence.15
This Comment reviews the Wyoming Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regarding independent constitutional interpretation of the Declaration of Rights
and demonstrates why the Court has largely been unable to develop and sustain an
independent constitutional jurisprudence.16 Part II provides a brief background
on independent state constitutional interpretation, highlighting another state’s
use of the neutral criteria approach.17 Part III examines the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s history of independent constitutional analysis and its debate about
interpreting the Declaration of Rights to provide greater protections than the

9

See id. at 129–130, 138 (citations omitted).

See id. at 130, 138 (citation omitted); see also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash.
1986); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621–22 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).
10

Williams, supra note 7, at 178; see also Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 484; Gronski v. State, 910
P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1996); Saldana, 846 P.2d at 621–22 (Golden, J., concurring). The Wyoming
Supreme Court held the neutral criteria is a precise analytically sound form of argument that can
justify resorting to the Wyoming Constitution. See id.; see also Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903,
909 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that a litigant must use a “precise, analytically sound approach” in order
for the Court to address a state constitutional claim (citation omitted)).
11

See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32 ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 830, 836 (Wyo. 2019); Saldana, 846 P.2d
at 622; see also Keiter, supra note 2, at 31.
12

13

See infra notes 174, 205, 246 and accompanying text.

See e.g., Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 838; Hathaway v. State, 2017 WY 92, ¶ 14
n.1, 399 P.3d 625, 630 n.1 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132,
137 (Wyo. 2014).
14

15

See infra notes 296–344 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 22–393 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 22–53 and accompanying text.
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Federal Constitution.18 Part IV argues the neutral criteria approach hinders
the development of Wyoming’s constitutional law because it elevates form over
substance and results in precedents that inherently are not based on a truly
independent analysis.19 Part V recommends the Court follow a more traditional
approach to independent constitutional analysis and address litigants’ state
constitutional claims which, at a minimum, discuss the relevant text and provide
some support using legitimate sources.20 This Comment concludes with a call
to action for judges, lawyers, and litigants to help in the development of state
constitutional law.21

II. The Resurgent Interest in State Constitutions and
Independent State Constitutional Analysis
Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Federal Bill of Rights only
applied to the federal government, designating the states as the primary guarantors of individual liberties.22 The framers of various state constitutions knew
this and intended to provide civil rights protections in their founding charters.23
However, many of the early state courts did not seriously consider individual
liberties, and thus neglected to enforce an important level of civil rights
protections.24 As a result, most states only had a limited amount of civil rights
jurisprudence prior to incorporation.25

18

See infra notes 54–295 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 296–344 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 345–77 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 378–93 and accompanying text.

See Baron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights
only applies to the federal government and that it is up to the states to provide protections for
individual rights); Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making
of American Constitutional Law 179–80 (2018); Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming
Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land & Water L. Rev. 527, 544 (1986) [hereinafter An Essay
on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation]; Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State
Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 635, 636 (1987).
22

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 544; Utter & Pitler,
supra note 22, at 636.
23

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 544; Utter & Pitler,
supra note 22, at 663; see also Brennan, supra note 7, at 490–91.
24

25
See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 663 (“During the pre-incorporation period, few
states developed a theoretical basis to build a principled civil rights jurisprudence.”). The term
incorporation refers to the act of applying selective provisions within the Federal Bill of Rights to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brennan, supra note 7, at
490 (discussing incorporation as “decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States [that] have
returned to the fundamental promises wrought by the blood of those who fought our War between
the States, promises which were thereafter embodied in our [F]ourteenth [A]mendment . . . .”).
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In the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to aggressively expand federal
civil liberties protections and enforce them against the states.26 This expansion
of federal civil liberties protections was due, in part, to most states’ failure to live
up to their traditionally conceived “role as the primary protector[s] of individual
libert[ies].”27 During this time, civil rights law under the Federal Constitution
became dominant, and state constitutional rights litigation mostly disappeared.28
By the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court restrained its expansion of federal civil
rights.29 As a result, many litigants began looking again to their state constitutions
to provide greater rights protections, which led to a renewed interest in state
constitutional law.30
Though some state courts fully embraced the resurgent interest in state
constitutional law, many states were skeptical about the legitimacy of independ
ent state constitutional analysis and the state court’s divergence from federal
precedent.31 Some academics, government officials, and judges directly opposed
expanding rights outside the federal minimum.32 They argued that disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court was not a legitimate basis for a state court
judge to supplant possible federal outcomes with their own desired outcomes.33
Some states responded by amending their constitutions to require state courts

26

See Brennan, supra note 7, at 490–91; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 636.

See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 636, 642 (citations omitted); see also Cutbirth v.
State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1288 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is apparent that failure of
state judicial and legislative commitment to the preservation of constitutional rights led to initial
intervention of federal courts through habeas corpus in the criminal-trial process. The developments
of the Frankfurter/Brennan/Warren court in relationship to denied justice in state courts were
hardly accidental.”).
27

28

See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 636.

See Michael J. Horan, The Wyoming Constitution: A Centennial Assessment, 26 Land &
Water L. Rev. 13, 16 (1991); see also Brennan, supra note 7, at 496–98.
29

30
See Keiter, supra note 2, at 45–46; Horan, supra note 29, at 16–17; see also Brennan, supra
note 7, at 503 (arguing that the federal retraction of individual rights protections “constitutes a
clear call to state courts to step into the breach.”). The resurgent interest in state constitutional law
and in arguing for greater protections under state constitutions is often called the “New Judicial
Federalism.” See Williams, supra note 7, at 113–14.

See Williams, supra note 7, at 119, 127; see also An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 22, at 564.
31

Williams, supra note 7, at 127; see People v. Scott, 593 N.E. 1328, 1348–49 (N.Y.
1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (arguing that the New York Court of Appeals “superimpose[d] its
preferred view of the constitutional universe”). See generally H.C. Macgill, Upon a Peak in Darien:
Discovering the Connecticut Constitution, 15 Conn. L. Rev. 7, 9 (1982) (describing independent
state constitutional analysis as “something of a cute trick . . . and not ‘real’ constitutional law at
all”); John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of Independence and
Activism, 29 Rutgers L. J. 701, 721 (1998) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court for granting
broader rights protections to a criminal defendant who confessed to murder while in police custody).
32

33

See Williams, supra note 7, at 127.
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to follow the interpretations of parallel federal rights.34 Opponents also argued
state courts who independently interpreted their constitutions were “reactionary,”
“unprincipled,” and “result-oriented.”35 These arguments, and the amendments
mandating a lock-step with federal precedent, challenge the legitimacy of
independent state constitutional analysis and the ability for state courts to grant
greater rights protections under their state constitutions.36
Responding to skepticism, many state supreme courts adopted a neutral
criteria approach to limit independent state constitutional interpretation.37
The neutral criteria approach lists a series of objective criteria or factors which
provide a basis for a state court to “resort” to the state’s constitution and deviate
from federal precedent in granting greater rights protections.38 For example, in
1986, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the neutral criteria approach in
State v. Gunwall.39 In Gunwall, the court addressed whether the police could
obtain telephone records without a warrant.40 The court acknowledged this case
presented a similar issue to the one found in Smith v. Maryland, where the U.S.
Supreme Court held the seizure of third party phone records did not require
a warrant.41 In determining whether to deviate from Smith, the Gunwall court
decided it would resort to independent constitutional analysis based on a neutral
criteria approach, asserting:

34
Id. at 128; see also Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a) (requiring California state courts to follow
the federal minimum due process rights regarding pupil school assignment or transportation); Fla.
Const. art. I, § 12 (requiring Florida state courts to follow U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment).
35

See Williams, supra note 7, at 138.

36

See id.

See id. at 129–30, 138 (citation omitted); see also, State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811
(Wash. 1986); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). The call
for a criteria or factor approach “can be seen as representing, in an important sense, a challenge to
the legitimacy of independent state constitutionalism itself.” Williams, supra note 7, at 150.
37

38
See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811; Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 (Golden, J., concurring);
Williams, supra note 7, at 137, 129–30 (describing the neutral criteria approach as a methodology
in which “the state supreme court . . . sets forth a list of circumstances (criteria or factors) under
which it says it will feel justified in interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the
Federal Constitution.” (citation omitted)).
39
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808. The Washington Supreme Court’s discussion in Gunwall is also
a good example of a “teaching opinion.” See id. at 811–13; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 144.
These types of opinions are designed to “alert the bar and bench to the possibilities of independent
state constitutional analysis and educat[e] them in the techniques of making state constitutional
arguments.” Id. Vermont Justice Thomas L. Hayes reasoned that a teaching opinion was the most
effective means of communicating the possibilities of independent state constitutional analysis
because a law review “would [only] be read by nine students, nine law professors, and the janitor
who was cleaning up at night at the law school.” See id. at 145 (citation omitted).
40

See Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 809.

41

See id. at 814; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
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The following nonexclusive neutral criteria are relevant in
determining whether, in a given situation, the Washington
State Constitution should be considered as extending broader
rights to its citizens than the United States Constitution: (1) the
textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional
history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and
(6) matters of particular state or local concern.42
The court further articulated, “[r]ecourse to our state constitution as an
independent source for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our
citizens must spring not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once
articulable, reasonable and reasoned.”43 Using this analytical form, the court
found justification to disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Smith
and, instead, ruled on independent state constitutional grounds.44 Following
Gunwall, the Washington Supreme Court used the neutral criteria approach as a
means to limit state constitutional development.45 The court limited development
by rejecting claims which failed to perfectly adhere to the analytical form of the
neutral criteria approach—even when litigants raised state constitutional claims
in the lower courts.46 The court’s strict insistence on analytical form ultimately
hindered the development of Washington’s independent state constitutional law.47
Despite the neutral criteria approach and its challenges to state consti
tutionalism, independent state constitutional analysis has become an accepted
and legitimate practice.48 In many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has approved
independent state constitutional analysis.49 For example, in Michigan v. Long, the
Court helped to facilitate independent state constitutional analysis by articulating
42

Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811 (emphasis added).

43

Id. at 813 (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)).

See id. at 814. Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court held that third party phone
records require a warrant under the Washington Constitution. See id. at 813–17.
44

45
See Williams, supra note 7, at 151–54; see also, e.g., State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514 (Wash.
1996); Richmond v. Thompson, 922 P.2d 1343 (Wash. 1996).

Williams, supra note 7, at 151–54; see also Thorne, 921 P.2d at 530, 533 (refusing to
address an independent state constitutional claim for failure to perform a Gunwall analysis);
Richmond, 922 P.2d at 1355 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for requiring litigants
to perform a rigid Gunwall analysis to raise an independent state constitutional claim).
46

47

See Williams, supra note 7, at 152–53.

48

See id. at 138.

See, e.g., Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 641 (2016) (Scalia, J., majority) (“The state courts
may experiment all they want with their own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this Court’s
decisions.” (citing Jeffery S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and
Its Aftermath, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1963, 1971–77 (2008)); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43
(1988); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding California’s grant of greater free speech rights in privately owned
shopping malls).
49
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the “plain statement” rule.50 This rule explains a state court need only make a plain
statement in its judgment to explain that its decision is based on adequate and
independent state grounds.51 In acknowledging the legitimacy of independent
state constitutional analysis, other states have explicitly rejected the neutral
criteria approach or lessened the rigidity of the briefing requirement.52 Ultimately,
independent state constitutional interpretation and argument for greater rights
protections will remain a legitimate feature of American federalism.53

III. Wyoming’s History of Independent Interpretation
of the Wyoming Declaration of Rights
Throughout its history, the Wyoming Supreme Court has given meaning to
some of the Wyoming Constitution’s provisions independent of the U.S Supreme
Court’s interpretations of parallel federal provisions.54 The Wyoming Supreme
Court has also created principles for interpreting the Wyoming Constitution
which it continues to apply.55 These principles remain significant when the Court
interprets the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights.56 After the federal
courts’ retreat on civil rights expansions in the 1970s, the Wyoming Supreme
Court encountered a resurgent interest in state constitutions.57 The Court was
split on how to interpret the Declaration of Rights in light of litigants’ new
attempts to argue for greater rights protections than those afforded under the
50

See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040–41.

Id. at 1041 (“If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake
to review the decision.”).
51

See Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 961, n.6 (Pa. 1995) (“The failure of a
litigant to present his state constitutional arguments in the form set forth in [a prior case] does
not constitute a fatal defect, although we continue to strongly encourage use of that format.”);
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 35–37, ¶ 37 n.6, 162 P.3d 1106, 1114–15, 1114 n.6 (Utah
2007) (rejecting the neutral criteria approach and a specific pleading formula for raising a state
constitutional claim).
52

Williams, supra note 7, at 133; see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 174 (“While the state
courts at times have played a critical role in advancing some constitutional rights, the question is
whether there is room for them to play a greater role in the future.”).
53

See, e.g., Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1992);
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980); see also Keiter, supra
note 2, at 29–31.
54

55
Keiter, supra note 2, at 29; see, e.g., Gordon v. State, 2018 WY 32, ¶¶ 28–44, 413 P.3d
1093, 1103–06 (Wyo. 2018); Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25,
¶¶ 40–49, 390 P.3d 728, 742– 44 (Wyo. 2017); Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 35–45, 88 P.3d
at 1064–67 (Wyo. 2004).
56

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 47– 49, 390 P.3d at 744; Keiter, supra note 2, at 31.

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 564; see also
Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1286, 1288 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (arguing for
the Court to independently analyze the protections afforded under the state constitution); Horan,
supra note 29, 15–17 (discussing the retrenchment of civils rights at the federal level and bringing
claims under the state constitution).
57
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Federal Constitution.58 Eventually, the Court settled on a form of the Gunwall
neutral criteria approach.59 The Court’s approach did not explicitly require
litigants to cover of each of the neutral criteria from Gunwall, but instead insisted
litigants use of some of the criteria in order for them to raise a principled and
analytically sound claim.60 Despite the Court’s adoption of this approach and
the multitude of litigants attempting to raise these claims, the Court has only
undergone a truly independent analysis in a small number of cases.61 More often
than not the Court declines to address independent state constitutional claims
due to litigants’ failure to adhere to the Court’s preferred analytic form.62 Even
though the Wyoming Supreme Court continues to insist on this rigid and limiting
analytic form, it routinely expresses a willingness to independently interpret the
Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights.63

A. Wyoming’s Early History Establishing Traditional Methods of
Constitutional Interpretation
Early in Wyoming’s constitutional history, the Wyoming Supreme Court
established and applied traditional principles of statutory interpretation to
give meaning to the state’s constitution.64 One notable case establishing such
principles is Rasmussen v. Baker.65 In Rasmussen, the Wyoming Supreme Court
interpreted the educational qualification for the right to vote found within the
Wyoming Constitution.66 The dispositive issue in the case was whether votes
cast by non-English speaking citizens were legal.67 Writing for the Court, Justice
58

See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993).

See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986); Vasquez, v. State, 990 P.2d 476,
484 (Wyo. 1999); Williams, supra note 7, at 178; supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text; see
also Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 (Golden, J., concurring); Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909
(Wyo. 1992).
59

60
See O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 24 n.4, 117 P.3d 401, 408 n.4 (Wyo. 2005); Vasquez,
990 P.2d at 484; see also Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 (Golden, J., concurring); Dworkin, 839 P.2d
at 909.
61

See infra notes 136–295 and accompanying text.

62

See infra notes 136–295 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 830, 836 (Wyo. 2019); Neely v.
Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶¶ 39–40, 390 P.3d 728, 741–42
(Wyo. 2017).
63

64
See Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 821–23 (Wyo. 1897); Bd. of Comm’rs of Converse
Cty. v. Burns, 29 P. 894, 898 (Wyo. 1892); see also Keiter, supra note 2, at 29–30 (noting the
Wyoming Supreme Court’s “strong jurisprudential tradition” in shaping the principles used to
interpret the Constitution).
65

Rasmussen, 50 P. 819 (Wyo. 1897).

See id. at 820. The text of the provision states in part, “[n]o person shall have the right to
vote who shall not be able to read the constitution of this state.” Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 9.
66

67
Rasmussen, 50 P. at 820. The votes “were cast for the said defendant by natives of Finland,
naturalized citizens of the United States, who were not able to read the constitution of the State of
Wyoming . . . .” Id. Though the Finnish people could not read in English, they were able to read
translations of the Constitution in Finnish. See id.
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Charles Potter first established that the purpose of construing a constitutional
provision is “to give effect to the intent of the people [who had] adopt[ed] it,” and
the framers expressed this intent within the text of the Wyoming Constitution.68
Furthermore, Justice Potter described the principle of plain meaning by expressing,
“[i]f the language employed is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for
construction.”69 He explained that plain meaning is defined as using words in
their natural sense—the sense people adopting the Wyoming Constitution would
have understood.70 Justice Potter also asserted the Wyoming Constitution is a
static instrument with a fixed meaning at the time it was adopted.71
In his analysis, Justice Potter looked to the Wyoming’s constitutional
convention debates for support regarding the original intent of the voter
qualification provision.72 Though there was strong evidence suggesting the framers
intentionally omitted the words “in the English language,” Justice Potter was still
skeptical that the omission changed the plain meaning of the text.73 Justice Potter
discussed how the convention debates are not a reliable source of information to
help construe any provision within the Wyoming Constitution and stated that
they are, “as a rule . . . deemed an unsafe guide.”74 Justice Potter concluded that
regardless of the framers’ original intent during the debates, the plain meaning of
the words required qualified voters to be able to read the Wyoming Constitution

See id. at 821 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Justice Potter also established
the principles of liberal and strict constructionism saying that “[s]tatutes which confer or extend the
elective franchise should be liberally construed” and that “any provision which excludes any class of
citizens from the exercise of the elective franchise ought to receive a strict construction . . . .” Id. at
822 (citations omitted).
68

69

Id. at 821.

70

Id. at 822 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824)).

See id. at 822 (citing Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 6 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. n.d.)). Though Rasmussen supports a static constitution in principle, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has deviated from it in multiple cases and has frequently found a more
flexible constitutional principle may apply. See infra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
71

72

See Rasmussen, 50 P. at 823–25.

See id. at 823–24. “For the very reason that it is possible that the omitted words may have
been considered unnecessary, it would be clearly unsafe to impute to even a purposed omission a
conclusive indication of but one intent and purpose behind it.” Id. at 824.
73

Id. at 824. Justice Potter stated that the debates can “in a limited degree, be consulted
in determining the interpretation to be given some doubtful phrase or provision . . . .” Id. Justice
Potter also demonstrated the convention debates’ unreliability by noting that convention delegates
frequently expressed concerns about “the uneducated foreign element” when drafting the voter
qualification language. Id. at 827. However, the original intent of the voter qualification is obscured
by the fact that some of the convention delegates actively campaigned to “the uneducated foreign
element” expressly saying that the voter qualification provisions did not require an ability to read in
English. See id. at 827–28; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 316–17 (discussing the use of voter
intent to determine the plain meaning of state constitutional text) (citation omitted).
74
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in the English language.75 In the years since Rasmussen, Wyoming state courts have
faithfully followed the traditional principles of statutory interpretation which the
Rasmussen Court established for interpreting the Wyoming Constitution.76
The Wyoming Supreme Court has applied these traditional principles of
interpretation to the individual rights and liberties enshrined in the Declaration
of Rights.77 For example, in State v. Boutler, the Court found an information
violated Wyoming’s search and seizure provision because it was based solely on
the prosecutor’s “information and belief.”78 The Court examined the plain text
of Article 1 Section 4 and held a prosecutor’s “information and belief ” was not
alone sufficient to establish “probable cause supported by affidavit.”79 Similarly,
in the case of In re McDonald, the Court determined whether a libel fine of one
thousand dollars was excessive, or cruel or unusual punishment, and whether
imprisonment for non-payment was imprisonment for debt.80 The Court looked
to the plain text of the Wyoming Constitution’s provisions regarding the right
against imprisonment for debt, cruel or unusual punishment, and excessive fines,
along with supporting case law from other states.81 It found the lower court’s
imposed fine against the defendant had not violated these provisions.82
75

Rasmussen, 50 P. at 828.

See Mgmt. Council of Wyo. Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998)
(describing the principles articulated in Rasmussen as still “in vogue” and having “been followed
faithfully”); see also, e.g., Tuttle v. Lee, 2018 WY 104, ¶ 10, 425 P.3d 998, 1000 (Wyo. 2018);
Powers v. State, 2014 WY 15, ¶ 8, 318 P.3d 300, 303–04 (Wyo. 2014); Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004
WY 49, ¶ 39, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065 (Wyo. 2004).
76

77
See Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶¶ 41–43, 390
P.3d 728, 741–43 (Wyo. 2017); Cathcart, 2004 WY ¶ 35–45, 88 P.3d at 1064–67. Some of the
traditional principles used involved interpreting the Wyoming Constitution based on the intent of
the framers, and that the framer’s intent is expressed in the text of the Wyoming Constitution, and
that the text should be interpreted using plain meaning. See generally Rasmussen, 50 P. 819.

See Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized.” (emphasis added)); State v. Boulter, 39 P. 883, 884
(Wyo. 1895). An “information” is a document prosecutors file in court to charge someone of a
crime. See Boulter, 39 P. at 883. The prosecution in Boutler charged the defendant with first degree
murder based solely on their “information and belief.” See id. at 884.
78

79
See Boulter, 39 P. at 884 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4);
see also In re Boulter, 39 P. 875, 876–79 (Wyo. 1895) (discussing the right to bail under the plain
text of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14., the history of bail under common law, supporting state case law,
and then rejecting the defendant’s claim that he had a right to bail after conviction); In re Boulter, 40
P. 520, 521–23 (Wyo. 1895) (upholding the procedure of indictment by information after bringing
up the plain text of multiple sections of the Declaration of Rights along with supporting state
case law).
80

See In re MacDonald, 33 P. 18, 20–21 (Wyo. 1893).

See id.; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 5. (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in
cases of fraud.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.”).
81

82

See In re MacDonald, 33 P. at 20–21.
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Though the traditional principles are foundational to any constitutional
interpretation, the Wyoming Supreme Court has also articulated more flexible
interpretive principles for construing the Wyoming Constitution.83 In Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co. v. Hall, the Court interpreted a constitutional provision
regarding the duties of the State Board of Equalization, and determined whether a
local or state agency was to assess the value of a railroad tie preserving plant.84 The
defendants argued that the framers of the Wyoming Constitution did not intend
the State Board of Equalization to assess tie preserving plants because they did not
expressly include tie preserving plants in that constitutional provision.85 Writing
for the Court, Justice Fred Blume rejected the defendant’s argument as too broad
a contention.86 He described the constitutional provision as “part of our organic
law” and said, “[t]he Constitution is, in a sense, a living thing, designed to meet
the needs of progressive society, amid all the detail changes to which such society
is subject.”87 Using the principle of a living constitution, Justice Blume held that
the constitutional provision at issue evolved to include tie preserving plants.88
The Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed the principle of the Wyoming
Constitution being a “living thing” in various cases since Hall.89

B. The Independent Constitutional Analysis of Wyoming’s Declaration
of Rights
In the first several decades after Wyoming achieved statehood, the Wyoming
Supreme Court analyzed the Declaration of Rights independent from federal

83

See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 26 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1933); Keiter, supra note

2, at 29.
84

See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 26 P.2d at 1071–72.

See id. at 1073. The constitutional language of the provision at that time stated “[t]he
duties of the state board shall be as follows: to assess at their actual value the franchises, roadway,
roadbed, rails and rolling stock and all other property, used in the operation of all railroads and
other common carriers, except machine shops, rolling mills and hotels in this state.” See id. at 1071
(quoting Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 10 (amended 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85

86

See id. at 1073.

87

Id.

See id. at 1073–74 (applying the maxims of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius and ejusdem generis and conducting a more direct textual analysis of the constitutional
provision to help reach the holding).
88

89
See, e.g., Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶ 17 n.4, 32 P.3d 313, 318 n.4 (Wyo.
2001); Campbell Cty Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1257–58 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Chicago
& N.W. Ry. Co., 26 P.2d at 1073 and Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 821 (Wyo. 1897)); Cty. Court
Judges Ass’n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960, 972–73 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring); State v.
McAdams, 714 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1986) (“a constitution is a flexible, vital, living document,
which must be interpreted in light of changing conditions of society.” (citation omitted)); see also
Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 181 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing the “penumbra
of protections provided by the Wyoming Constitution”).
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constitutional precedent.90 In McDonald, the Court considered Wyoming’s cruel
or unusual punishment provision and recognized McDonald’s one thousand
dollar fine for libel was the highest possible fine under the governing law.91 The
Court speculated, “[t]he constitutional provisions aimed at cruel and unusual
punishments were probably intended to prevent the imposition of obsolete,
painful, and degrading punishments, such as the whipping post, the pillory, and
such as making capital a grade of offenses like larceny, forgery, and the like.”92
In its analysis, the Court independently adopted a rule of proportionality to
govern Wyoming cruel or unusual punishment claims.93 Under this rule, the
Court examines a defendant’s offense and determines whether the imposed
punishment is proportionate to the offense committed.94 McDonald therefore
provided independent meaning to the cruel or unusual punishment provision in
the Declaration of Rights early in Wyoming’s history.95
The Court’s history of independent constitutional analysis is most
apparent in the criminal procedure context.96 In Maki v. State, the police
arrested a criminal defendant but did not inform him that the prosecution could
use any of his statements against him at trial.97 In its analysis, the Wyoming
Supreme Court interpreted the Wyoming Constitution’s privilege against selfincrimination and found a general rule implied from the text itself involved the

90
See, e.g., State v. Boulter, 39 P. 883, 884 (Wyo. 1895) (independently analyzing Wyoming’s
probable cause requirement); In re Boulter, 39 P. 875, 876–79 (Wyo. 1895) (independently
analyzing Wyoming’s right to bail provision); In re MacDonald, 33 P. 18, 20–21 (Wyo. 1893); see
also Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483–84 (Wyo. 1999) (mentioning that the court had undergone
independent analysis in the search and seizure context until the 1920s and 30s).
91
In re MacDonald, 33 P. at 21; see also supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. Based on
the facts of the case, the Court stated that the fine did “not seem to be more than commensurate
with the gravity of the offense.” In re MacDonald, 33 P. at 21.
92
In re MacDonald, 33 P. at 21 (emphasis added). When the Court said, “cruel and unusual
punishments” it was referring to multiple states’ constitutional provisions and not necessarily
suggesting that “cruel and unusual punishment” provisions are interpreted the same way as “cruel or
unusual punishment provisions.” See id.
93

See id.

See id. (“But for the disposition of this case we may adopt the rule contended for, and then
we must find, in order to declare the law unconstitutional, that the punishment provided by the law
is so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the people.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting People v. Morris, 45 N.W. 591, 592 (Mich. 1890)).
94

See id.; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.”).
95

96
See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920); Maki v. State, 112 P. 334 (Wyo. 1911);
State v. Boulter, 39 P. 883 (Wyo. 1895).
97
Maki, 112 P. at 335. (“He was not here told that he need not make a statement or might
make a statement or be sworn as a witness and that if he made a statement whether under oath or
not it might be used against him if subsequently tried upon the charge for which he was then under
arrest and that he could do as he pleased about the matter.”).
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voluntariness of the accused’s statements.98 The Court also analyzed other states’
case law on issues of voluntary statements made by criminal defendants, but
never explicitly referenced federal precedent.99 The Court held that a criminal
defendant’s voluntary statements were not admissible at trial unless the defendant
had been “informed of his rights or warned that his evidence might thereafter be
used against him . . . .”100 The Maki holding resulted in the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s adoption of a procedure equivalent to Miranda rights fifty-five years
before the U.S. Supreme Court.101
Another notable criminal procedure case which exemplifies independent
constitutional analysis is State v. Peterson.102 In Peterson, the Court determined
whether a search warrant violated the search and seizure provisions of the
Wyoming and Federal Constitutions.103 The Court compared the state and
federal constitutional provisions, postulating, “[the Wyoming] Constitution
is some stronger, in that it uses ‘affidavit’ instead of ‘oath or affirmation’; the
word ‘affidavit’ requiring the matter to be in written form.”104 In its analysis,
the Court discussed state and federal precedent, finding the warrant at issue was
“null and void.”105 The Court further ordered the government to return the seized
property to the defendant and “to suppress all evidence in relation [to the voided
warrant].”106 In so holding, the Wyoming Supreme Court independently adopted
a version of the federal exclusionary rule forty-one years before the U.S. Supreme
Court applied it to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.107

See id.; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 (“No person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in any criminal case . . . .”).
98

99

See Maki, 112 P. at 335–36.

100

Id. at 335.

101

See Keiter, supra note 2, at 53; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).

102

State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342 (Wyo. 1920).

103

See id. at 343–44.

Id. at 345. Compare Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 (“[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing
to be seized.”) (emphasis added), with U.S. Const. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
104

105

Peterson, 194 P. at 351.

Id. at 350. The Court reasoned “if letters and private documents may be seized in violation
of the constitutional safeguard and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of a
crime, then the constitutional provision is ineffectual and of no value.” Id. at 351 (citation and
quotation omitted).
106

107
See id.; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also Keiter, supra note 2, at 53.
Though the Court used federal precedent as support for multiple issues in Peterson, on the issue
of unconstitutionally seized evidence it adopted its own version of the exclusionary rule before it
analyzed cases such as Weeks v. United States. See Peterson, 194 P. at 350–54. See generally Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (creating the federal version of the exclusionary rule).
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In 1938, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided an important procedural
and substantive due process case where it discussed the limitations of the state’s
police power.108 In State v. Langley, Justice Blume held an economic regulation
did not violate the federal or state constitutions’ due process clauses or the
Wyoming Constitution’s right against absolute, arbitrary power.109 Particularly,
in discussing Wyoming’s constitutional provisions, Justice Blume independently
based his analysis on the text of those provisions and a broad overview of political
philosophy and history.110 He found the Wyoming Constitution recognizes
natural rights and the framers intended that these rights “should not be unduly
invaded.”111 Justice Blume further discussed how the police power of the state
is not absolute, and explained that the tension between individual liberties and
the power of government to abridge those liberties is a matter for the judiciary
to solve.112 He asserted, “[c]ourts must be, and are, whether willingly or not, the
ultimate arbiters as to whether or not there is, in a particular case, an unwarranted
invasion of [our] guaranteed rights[.]”113 Langley ultimately provides another
example of the Court’s independent analysis of the Wyoming Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights.114
Despite the Wyoming Supreme Court’s early history of independent
constitutional analysis of the Declaration of Rights, over time the Court chose
to follow federal case law regarding parallel rights provisions in the Federal
Constitution.115 The Court continued to follow federal case law throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, which “effectively truncated further development of the
Court’s earlier independent constitutional jurisprudence.”116 Following federal
precedent became necessary, particularly in the search and seizure context, due
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of individual rights under the Fourth

108

See State v. Langley, 84 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1938).

See id. at 768–69, 781; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 7 (“Absolute, arbitrary
power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the
largest majority.”). The economic regulation at issue was a progressive anticompetition statute. See
Langley, 84 P.2d at 768–69.
109

See Langley, 84 P.2d at 769–70 (discussing, among others, Thomas Paine’s “Rights of Man”
and Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations”).
110

111

See id. at 770.

112

See id. at 770–71.

113

Id. at 771 (emphasis added).

See id. at 770–71. Though the decision does discuss federal case law later on, it is important
to remember that the Court also had to decide the case under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
the Court only used federal precedent as guidance. See Langley, 84 P.2d 767.
114

115
See Keiter, supra note 2, at 31 n.100 (citing Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483–84
(Wyo. 1999)).
116

Keiter, supra note 2, at 31 n.100.
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Amendment.117 If state courts failed to comply with the increased protections
regarding unreasonable search and seizure, the courts were at risk of the U.S.
Supreme Court suppressing criminal evidence through the exclusionary rule.118
The U.S. Supreme Court also expanded other federal civil rights protections at
this time, ensuring the work of state courts would be more about enforcing the
Federal Bill of Rights rather than about independently interpreting and applying
their state constitution’s rights provisions.119 Even though the Wyoming Supreme
Court followed the trend of applying federal case law, it frequently mentioned
the independent role of the Wyoming Constitution in the State’s jurisprudence,
alluding to its willingness to independently interpret the Declaration of Rights.120

C. The Resurgent Interest in Independent State Constitutional Analysis in
Wyoming and the Wyoming Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Neutral
Criteria Approach
In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to limit its expansion of federal
civil rights, which caused a resurgent interest in state constitutional law as litigants
began to rely on independent state constitutional analysis for greater rights
protections.121 Before this resurgence, the Wyoming Supreme Court frequently
acknowledged the independent role of the Wyoming Constitution.122 Despite
this acknowledgment, the Court rarely analyzed the Declaration of Rights truly
independent from the interpretations of parallel federal provisions.123 If the Court
did conduct an independent analysis it was often inconsistent with state precedent
or relied heavily on federal precedent.124 However, when the resurgent interest in
state constitutions took hold, the Wyoming Supreme Court more fully discussed

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483–84 (noting the practice where state courts follow federal
precedent under the Fourth Amendment).
117

See id. Because early state courts failed to seriously consider civil rights protections, the U.S.
Supreme Court had to do so, and its rulings often went beyond the guarantees of state constitutions.
See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 636, 642 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 22–30 and
accompanying text.
118

119

See Brennan, supra note 7, at 490–93.

120

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550.

Williams, supra note 7, at 113–14. The resurgent interest in state constitutional law often
called the New Judicial Federalism. See supra notes 26–31 and accompanying text.
121

122

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550.

Id. But see Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332–33 (Wyo. 1980)
(finding a fundamental right to education under the Wyoming Constitution’s equal protection
provision thus granting greater protection than the Federal Constitution).
123

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550, 558. This
inconsistency with state precedent and overreliance on federal precedent is still a problem today. See
infra notes 225–39 and accompanying text.
124
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and applied independent constitutional analysis and, in doing so, occasionally
granted greater rights protections.125
From the 1980s into the 1990s, Wyoming Supreme Court Justices Thomas
Urbigkit and Michael Golden helped push for the independent interpretation
of the Declaration of Rights.126 Justice Urbigkit first called for this type of
constitutional interpretation in a footnote comment within his dissent from
Duffy v. State.127 He said, “[t]he Wyoming Constitution should be considered and
defined to provide greater protection to its citizens’ individual rights than may
be afforded them under the federal constitution. Decisions should be based first
upon the state constitution ‘which protects fundamental rights independently of
the United States Constitution.’”128 A year later, Justice Urbigkit expanded on this
assertion in his dissent in Cutbirth v. State.129 Quoting a law review, he argued:
Because state supreme courts are ultimately responsible for
state law, they owe the state and the nation a duty to provide careful and thoughtful state constitutional jurisprudence.
State courts can do that by independently analyzing the
protections their state constitutions provide. State constitutions
and bills of rights ought to be more than mere compilations of
“glittering generalities.”130
In Black v. State, Justice Urbigkit joined the majority with Justice Richard J.
Macy, holding a pre-arrest coercive police interrogation violated the Wyoming

125
See, e.g., Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389–90 (Wyo. 1995) (Golden, J., majority)
(finding the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection of an individual’s right to
remain silent); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring) (Urbigkit,
J., dissenting); Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 164–165 (Wyo. 1992)
(Urbigkit, J., majority) (finding the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection under its
equal protection clauses); Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909–12, 920–22 (Wyo. 1992)
(Golden, J., majority) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1991)
(finding the Wyoming Constitution provides greater due process protections); Cutbirth v. State,
751 P.2d 1257, 1286 (Wyo. 1988) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 763 n.3
(Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1986) (Macy,
J., majority) (finding the Wyoming Constitution provides criminal defendants greater protection of
their right to a jury trial).

See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Justice Richard J. Macy was also a part of the
push for greater protections under the Wyoming Constitution and actually issued majority opinions affecting as much. See Brenner, 723 P.2d at 559, 561; Black, 820 P.2d at 970, 972; see also
Saldana, 846 P.2d at 621 (Macy, J., specially concurring).
126

127

Duffy, 730 P.2d at 763 n.3 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

128

Id. (quoting State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J. 1986)).

129

Cutbirth, 751 P.2d at 1286 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1286 (quoting Steve McAllister, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and
Assessment of Current Methodology, 35 U. Kan. L. Rev. 593, 623 (1987)).
130
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Constitution’s due process clause.131 Justice Macy stated, in what is essentially
the entire constitutional argument, “[a] line is drawn by the due process clause
of the Wyoming Constitution. We are free to grant more rights to our citizens
under the Wyoming Constitution than they are entitled to have under the United
States Constitution.”132 With this greater protection in mind, the Court held
that coercive interrogation “does not comport with this state’s notions of due
process” and ultimately suppressed the statements the appellant made to the
police.133 Justice Golden dissented in Black, in part due to his concern with the
majority’s lack of state constitutional analysis.134 He argued the majority had not
based its state constitutional holding on a “principled analytic jurisprudence”
and that it “fail[ed] to demonstrate why the state’s due process clause is more
protective than its federal counterpart.”135
A year later, Justice Golden wrote for the majority in Dworkin v. L.F.P.136
This case is the first teaching opinion by the Wyoming Supreme Court regarding
independent state constitutional analysis and greater rights protections.137 In
Dworkin, one of the main issues was whether the Declaration of Rights’ free
speech provision precluded summary judgement in libel actions.138 In analyzing
Dworkin’s constitutional argument, Justice Golden held a litigant must use “a
precise, analytically sound approach” to bring a state constitutional claim.139
He insisted litigants provide the Court with arguments and briefs adhering to
an analytically sound form “to ensure the future growth of this important area
of law.”140 Justice Golden held that Dworkin failed to properly raise the state
constitutional claim because she did not present the proper constitutional

131

See Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 971–72 (Wyo. 1991).

See id. at 972 (citing Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo. 1980)).
132

133

See id.

See id. at 975, 977. (Golden, J., dissenting). Justice Golden further mentioned “[t]he
majority boldly declares that the police in their questioning of Mrs. Black crossed the line drawn by
that due process clause. Declaring it is one thing, demonstrating it, quite another.” Id. at 977.
134

135

Id.

136

Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992).

See id. at 920–22 (listing a series of law reviews on state constitutional interpretation,
notably including Brennan, supra note 7, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 22, Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, and Williams, supra note 7); Williams, supra note 7, at 146
(citing Dworkin as a teaching opinion); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
137

138

See Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 906; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20.

139

Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 909 (citation omitted).

Id. Today the Court continues to insist that litigants adhere to the briefing and presentation rule for the Court to independently analyze state constitutional claims; the Court later
established the neutral criteria approach as a way to satisfy this rule. See infra notes 186–97
accompanying text.
140
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analysis or arguments.141 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed its goal of developing
an independent state constitutional jurisprudence “through an appropriate
analytical technique.”142
In the same year the Court decided Dworkin, Justices Urbigkit and
Golden joined the majority in Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner’s Office.143 In
Johnson, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a pair of statutes which
authorized the government to suspend driver’s licenses belonging to people
younger than nineteen years old who violated any alcohol or drug law.144
Writing for the majority, Justice Urbigkit began by stating the Court should
address state claims first and avoid federal constitutional questions when
legitimately possible.145 He also acknowledged that state constitutions may be
a source of greater civil rights protections.146 In the constitutional analysis itself,
Justice Urbigkit looked to multiple provisions within the Declaration of Rights,
he employed principles of statutory interpretation, and he discussed Wyoming
case law to support his propositions.147 Justice Urbigkit’s methodology in this
opinion exemplifies a truly independent constitutional analysis of Wyoming’s
Declaration of Rights.148
Justice Urbigkit’s analysis in Johnson also demonstrates the Court’s ability
to grant greater rights protections under the Wyoming Constitution.149 In
discussing equal protection, Justice Urbigkit stated “[t]he Wyoming Constitution
is construed to protect people against legal discrimination more robustly than
does the federal constitution.”150 Justice Urbigkit also analyzed the statutes at
141

Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 909.

Id. In a footnote, the Court mentioned that Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington
Supreme Court “[had] co-authored a particularly helpful article for the practicing lawyer on
formulating and presenting a state constitutional argument.” Id. at 909 n.4 (citing Utter & Pitler,
supra note 22). The Court also referenced its appendix of law reviews. See id.
142

143
Johnson v. State Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992). The Court was divided
2–2–1 with Justices Urbigkit and Golden in the majority, Justices Thomas and Cardine specially
concurring, and Justice Brown dissenting. See id.
144
See id. at 159– 61. “[T]he statutes provide retributory punishment via driver’s license
suspension where the offense for which the punishment is inflicted involves neither driving nor
motor vehicle use.” Id. at 159.
145
See id. at 164 (citations omitted) (“If state laws violate the Wyoming Constitution, then we
need not examine their relation to the federal constitution.”).
146

Id. (citations omitted).

See id. at 164–80. The minimal amount of Wyoming constitutional history in the analysis
is also notable. See id.
147

148

See id. at 159–81.

149

See id. at 164–80.

Id. at 165 (citing Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980);
Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978)); see also Wyo. Const. art 1, §§ 2–3. Justice Urbigkit
argued the Wyoming Constitution’s equal protection provision, “even at the lowest traditional
150
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issue under the Declaration of Rights’ clauses regarding double jeopardy, cruel
or unusual punishment, the humane penal code, and the uniform operation of
general law.151 Ultimately, the Court in Johnson concluded the statutes at issue
were unconstitutional under the “penumbra of protections provided by the
Wyoming Constitution.”152
Wyoming’s most significant case involving independent constitutional
interpretation is Saldana v. State.153 In Saldana, the defendant appealed his case
solely based on the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure provision.154 The
five members of the Wyoming Supreme Court split four ways in addressing the
issue of independent constitutional interpretation.155 The majority determined
it was more appropriate to follow federal precedent, in part, because the
Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure provision is “virtually identical” to
the Fourth Amendment in the Federal Constitution.156 The majority reasoned,
though the federal courts’ interpretations of the Fourth Amendment establish
only minimum requirements, the Wyoming Supreme Court closely adheres to
them unless the Wyoming State Legislature directs otherwise.157 The majority
then acknowledged it had the freedom to provide greater protections under the
Wyoming Constitution, but ultimately held that the facts of the case did not
merit any additional protections for Saldana.158 Justice Macy, specially concurring,
scrutiny level, empowers courts to scrutinize classification legislation more carefully than they can
under federal doctrine.” Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting An Essay
on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 553); see also Wilson v. State Office of
Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90, 95–96 (Wyo. 1992) (noting that “[a]lthough in the past we have
held that Wyoming’s equal protection guarantee is identical to the federal protection, we recently
reexamined the equal protection provision of the Wyoming Constitution and found that the
Wyoming guarantee is broader than the federal protection.” (citing Johnson, 838 P.2d at 165)).
See Johnson, 838 P.2d at 167–81; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 (“No person shall
be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1,
§ 15 (“The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention.”);
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 34 (“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.”).
151

152

See Johnson, 839 P.2d at 181.

See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993); see also Williams, supra note 7, at 178
(mentioning Saldana and the Wyoming Supreme Court’s debate “on the proper methodology to
apply in cases where litigants argued for greater protection under the state constitution”).
153

154

Saldana, 846 P.2d at 606– 07; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.

155

See Saldana, 846 P.2d at 604.

See id. at 610–12. The majority specifically chose to follow the reasoning in the federal
case Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See id. at 611. But cf. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808,
814 (Wash. 1986) (finding as an independent state constitutional matter that it was appropriate to
deviate from the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith).
156

157

See Saldana, 846 P.2d at 611 (citations omitted).

See id. at 612 (concluding “that the substantial identity of the constitutional provisions
involved does not suggest, nor do we perceive it appropriate in this instance to recognize, any
increased protection as being afforded by our state constitution.” (citations omitted)).
158
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appeared to reject the majority’s dicta regarding independent state constitutional
analysis.159 He argued the Court should not “blindly follow” federal precedent
interpreting the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution when the Court
interprets the parallel provision in the Wyoming Constitution.160
Justice Golden wrote a separate concurrence, specifically to address independ
sent state constitutional analysis.161 He criticized the appellant for poorly briefing
the state constitutional claim and for urging the Court to adopt the reasoning
in State v. Gunwall without appropriately undergoing a Gunwall analysis or
using another suitable analytical technique.162 Justice Golden then recommended
litigants use the Gunwall analytical approach when briefing state constitutional
claims in Wyoming.163 Justice Golden further expressed the Wyoming Supreme
Court was open to independently interpreting the Wyoming Constitution.164 He
concluded by stating, “[r]ecourse to the Wyoming Constitution as an independent
source for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must
spring from a process that is articulable, reasonable, and reasoned.”165
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Urbigkit attacked the majority’s “lock-step”
approach with federal law.166 He argued the majority was abandoning Wyoming’s
heritage of independent constitutional analysis by closely adhering to federal
precedent.167 He further contended the failure to give substance to the Wyoming
Constitution would cause it to become “displaced” and “amended” by case
outcomes “politically postured by the United States Supreme Court.”168 Justice
Urbigkit also argued for the legitimacy of independent constitutional interpretation
and defended granting greater rights protections to Wyoming citizens.169

159

See id. at 621 (Macy, J., specially concurring).

160

Id.

161

See id. (Golden, J., concurring).

See id. at 621–22 (arguing “[t]he problem is that appellant must do much more than ask;
he must show” and “[t]his court may not frame and make his argument for him”).
162

See id. at 622, 624 (citing Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992)); supra
notes 42– 43 and accompanying text. Justice Golden also cited two law reviews and suggested that
there are “[o]ther analytical techniques.” See Saldana, 846 P.2d at 622 n.2; see also Utter & Pitler,
supra note 22.
163

164

See Saldana, 846 P.2d at 624 (citing Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 909).

Saldana, 846 P.2d at 624 (citing State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash. 1986)); see also
supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
165

166

Saldana, 846 P.2d at 624–64 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

167

Id. at 624.

168

Id. at 627.

See Saldana, 846 P.2d at 646 – 64. In the body of his dissent, Justice Urbigkit cited many
law review articles and other publications that discussed the methods of arguing for greater rights
protections, as well as a variety of other legal subjects that sought to legitimate the independent
application of state constitutional rights. See id.
169
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Saldana best demonstrates the independent constitutional analysis debate
as it took place in Wyoming.170 After the Court decided Saldana, the Gunwall
neutral criteria approach became known in Wyoming as the Saldana factors.171
Many litigants soon began arguing for greater protections under the Wyoming
Constitution using the Saldana factors or attempted to use a different approach
while citing Justice Golden’s concurrence in Saldana.172 At this time, the
Wyoming Supreme Court had yet to settle on how or whether it would go about
independently interpreting the Wyoming Constitution.173

D. Arguing for Independent Constitutional Analysis and Greater Rights
Protections Under the Saldana Factors
In the years after Saldana, the Wyoming Supreme Court mainly used the
analytical framework of the Saldana factors as a justification to limit or decline
addressing independent state constitutional arguments.174 In Guerra v. State,
the Court indicated it would undergo an independent analysis of Guerra’s state
constitutional claim, but only as it related to the warrant at issue in the case.175 The
Court mentioned Guerra’s state constitutional argument was only based on the
textual difference between the state and federal search and seizure provisions.176
The difference between the search and seizure provisions was the Wyoming
Constitution’s requirement of an affidavit.177 Thus, the Court reasoned it would
only address the Wyoming Constitution’s affidavit requirement on independent
state grounds.178 Then in Gronski v. State, Gronski argued the Saldana factors
were not a suitable analytical technique for asserting an independent state
See Williams, supra note 7, at 178 (mentioning Wyoming’s debate on constitutional
methodology starting with Saldana). The Saldana opinion is also another teaching opinion from
the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Saldana, 846 P.2d 604.
170

171
See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 15, 437 P.3d 830, 836–37 (Wyo. 2019) (calling the
factors the Saldana factors); see also Kovach v. State, 2013 WY 46, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 97, 112 (Wyo.
2013) (calling the factors the O’Boyle factors while also citing Saldana ); Mogard v. City of Laramie,
2001 WY 88, ¶ 7, 32 P.3d 313, 315–16 (Wyo. 2001) (calling the factors the Saldana test).
172

See infra notes 174– 85 and accompanying text.

See Williams, supra note 7, at 178 (citations omitted); see also infra notes 174–85 and
accompanying text.
173

See, e.g., Callaway v. State, 954 P.2d 1365, 1370 –71 (Wyo. 1998); Gronski v. State, 910
P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1996); Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 413 (Wyo. 1995); Guerra v. State, 897
P.2d 447, 451 (Wyo. 1995).
174

175
See Guerra, 897 P.2d at 451 (citing Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994));
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621–24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring)). Another search and
seizure issue from the case involved the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Guerra,
897 P.2d at 456–57.
176

Guerra, 897 P.2d at 451.

177

Id.

See id. Even though the Court stated it was ruling on independent state grounds, it heavily
relied on federal precedent in its analysis. See id. at 451– 62. The search warrant at issue in the
case was held to be valid. See id. at 462.
178
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constitutional claim because the historical and legal information did not exist to
satisfy them.179 The Court rejected this argument and declined to independently
interpret the Wyoming Constitution because Gronski had not performed an
adequate state constitutional analysis.180
Further demonstrating Saldana’s limiting effect, in Lovato v. State, the
Court declined the opportunity to undergo an independent constitutional
analysis because the “[a]ppellant did little more than quote the relevant Wyoming
constitutional provisions and provide some general analysis of Wyoming due
process law.”181 The Court further explained its decision to not independently
analyze, stating “[a]bsent a more complete and specific analysis of the constitutional
language and its history, we refuse to consider Appellant’s state constitutional
arguments.”182 These cases demonstrate the Court’s uncertainty in precisely
what constituted appropriate grounds for undergoing an independent state
constitutional interpretation.183 The Court simply declined to address the state
constitutional claims rather than articulate what it requires for an appropriate
analysis.184 In doing so, the Court placed the burden of articulating a “precise,
analytically sound” argument onto litigants.185
By 1999, the Court settled the independent state constitutional interpre
tation discussion in Vasquez v. State.186 In Vasquez, the Court considered whether
179
See Gronski, 910 P.2d at 565. “In Gronski’s view, the only available analytical technique
was to determine whether Wyoming values required a judicial interpretation that this provision
afforded more protection than its federal counterpart.” Id.; see also Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299,
308 (Wyo. 1999) (finding the Gunwall factors to be “speculative at best”).
180
See Gronski, 910 P.2d at 565– 66 (“[I]nvitations to independently interpret the state
provision, unaccompanied by appropriate constitutional analysis, have been rejected.” (citing, e.g.,
Saldana, 846 P.2d at 612)). The Court also noted its “approach in the search and seizure area has
usually employed the method of reading the state and federal constitutional provisions together
and treating the scope of the state provision the same as the scope of the federal provision.” Id. at
565 (citations omitted). Overall, the Court did not clarify what an appropriate state constitutional
analysis would look like. See id. at 565– 66. The Court only concluded “[u]ntil appropriate state
constitutional analysis is presented, an invitation that we should expand the rights protected by the
state constitution beyond the protection provided by the federal constitution will not receive the
court’s attention.” Id. at 566 (citing Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 557 (Wyo. 1992)).
181

See Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 413 (Wyo. 1995).

See id. The Court cited Justice Golden’s concurrence in Saldana to support its refusal to
address the state constitutional claim. See id.
182

183
See supra notes 174– 82 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 177–78
(discussing the debate over the neutral criteria approach and the proper methodology for arguing
greater protections under state constitutions).
184

See supra notes 174–82 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 174– 82 and accompanying text; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at
656 (mentioning that “state courts have equal responsibility for independently interpreting their
state constitutions”).
185

Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 486 (Wyo. 1999); Williams, supra note 7, at 178 (noting
that in 1999 Wyoming “appeared to settle on the criteria approach”).
186
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the Belton rule, a federal rule which allows police officers to search a motorist’s
passenger compartment for weapons or destructible evidence, is valid under
the Wyoming Constitution.187 Justice Golden, writing for a unanimous court,
adopted the “precise, analytically sound” and neutral criteria approaches he
put forth in Dworkin and his concurrence in Saldana.188 He then applied an
independent state constitutional analysis to the Wyoming Constitution’s search
and seizure provision.189 In his analysis, Justice Golden lamented the lack of
history available regarding the framers’ intent when enacting Wyoming’s search
and seizure provision.190 However, he did acknowledge the framers intended
a liberal construction of the Declaration of Rights and their “deep rooted
concern for individual rights.”191 By looking at the Wyoming Constitution as a
whole, Justice Golden also recognized it contains more rights with more specific
and detailed language than the Federal Constitution.192 Ultimately, Justice
Golden believed future litigants and the Wyoming Supreme Court should
develop Wyoming’s search and seizure provision on sound principles regardless of
federal precedent.193
Continuing his independent constitutional analysis, Justice Golden analyzed Wyoming case law regarding prior interpretations of Wyoming’s search and
seizure provision.194 The principles articulated in these old search and seizure
cases led Justice Golden to conclude the Wyoming Constitution narrowed
187

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d. at 482; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 484–86 (“The criteria listed in Saldana are part of an analytically
sound approach to developing our own constitutional theory concerning the rights declared in the
Wyoming Constitution, and litigants need not restrict their analysis to distinguishing between the
state and federal constitutions.”); see also Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶ 6, 32 P.3d 313,
315 (Wyo. 2001) (acknowledging that “Vasquez represents a significant step in the development of
state constitutional analysis in Wyoming”); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 307–11 (Wyo. 1999)
(discussing Vasquez’s use of the Saldana factors and subsequently applying them).
188

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483–89. “The issue of whether this Court should consider
an independent interpretation of the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure provision was
answered affirmatively with instructions that a litigant must provide a precise, analytically sound
approach when advancing an argument to independently interpret the state constitution.” Id. at
484 (citing Dworkin v. L.F.P. Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992)); see also Saldana v. State, 846
P.2d 604, 621–24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring)).
189

190

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483–85.

191

See id. at 484–85 (citation omitted).

192

Id. at 485.

Id. Justice Golden also stated that no matter how sound principles are developed, “a state
constitutional analysis is required unless a party desires to have an issue decided solely under the
Federal Constitution.” Id.
193

See id. at 486–89. Many of the analyzed cases were from the 1920s when the Wyoming
Supreme Court independently interpreted the Wyoming Constitution. See id; see also Kenneth
DeCock & Erin Mercer, Comment, Balancing the Scales of Justice: How Will Vasquez v. State Affect
Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest in Wyoming?, 1 Wyo. L. Rev. 139, 148–52 (2001) (analyzing
Vasquez and the older precedents to discuss the history of “reasonableness” under the Wyoming
Constitution’s search and search provision).
194
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the application of the Belton rule.195 In reaching this conclusion, he held that
the Wyoming Constitution “requires a search be reasonable under all of the
circumstances as determined by the [Wyoming] judiciary, in light of the historical
intent of our search and seizure provision.”196 In rejecting the bright-line Belton
rule, the “reasonable under all of the circumstances” test potentially provided
greater protections to criminal defendants regarding search and seizure issues than
that afforded by the Federal Constitution at the time.197
Soon after Vasquez, the Wyoming Supreme Court undertook an independent constitutional analysis in Mogard v. City of Laramie.198 In Mogard, the appellant
asked the Court to determine whether the Declaration of Rights’ provision
guaranteeing the right to counsel gave him a right to speak to an attorney before
deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test.199 The Court explicitly applied

195
See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 489. Justice Golden found Wyoming’s prior independent case
law did not favor bright line rules and instead preferred a reasonable under all the circumstances
analysis. See id. at 488– 89. Justice Golden also acknowledged that Belton contained minimal
protection and provided national uniformity, however, “Belton’s national citizenry rationale does
not apply in Wyoming.” Id. at 489.
196

Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 194 P. 342, 345 (Wyo. 1920)).

See id. at 489; see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (limiting the reach of
the Belton rule). Despite the Court’s creation of a more protective test in Vasquez, the Court still
found the Belton-style search in the case was lawful. See Vasquez. 990 P.2d at 478, 489. In fact,
there is likely only one case after Vasquez where the Wyoming Supreme Court found a search to
be unreasonable through the Vasquez test that was, at the same time, reasonable under the federal
Belton rule. See Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶¶ 11–21, 171 P.3d 525, 530–35 (Wyo. 2007); see
also id. ¶ 37, 171 P.3d at 539 (Hill, J., dissenting) (“Vasquez himself did not reap the benefit of
the Vasquez decision, so Pierce is the first to be accorded the enhanced protections it provides to
Wyoming citizens.”). In Pierce, the Court found the defendant had made an adequate constitutional
analysis because the defendant cited two relevant cases, the text of the constitutional provision,
and performed an analysis under the “reasonable under all the circumstances” test based on the
facts of the case. See id. ¶ 11, 171 P.3d at 530–31 (discussing Vasquez and O’Boyle v. State, 2005
WY 95, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005)). In all, Pierce represents an example of a truly independent
constitutional analysis under the Wyoming Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 11–21, 171 P.3d at 530–35.
197

198
See Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, 32 P.3d 313 (Wyo. 2001). This case provides
a more truly independent analysis than Vasquez because the Court relied significantly less on federal
precedent and based its analysis on Wyoming case law, the text of the constitutional provision at
issue, and other states’ case law. See id. ¶¶ 4–31, 32 P.3d at 315–25. The Court also decided this case
solely under the Wyoming Constitution. See id. ¶2, 32 P.3d at 314.

Id. ¶ 2, 32 P.3d at 314; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by counsel . . . .”). The appellant raised
the question solely under the Wyoming Constitution because the Court had previously ruled there
is no federal constitutional right to consult with an attorney in this specific situation. See Mogard,
¶¶ 2–4, 32 P.3d at 314 –15 (citing Nesius v. State Dep’t of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle
Div., 791 P.2d 939, 942– 44 (Wyo. 1990)); Wheeler v. State, 705 P.2d 861, 863– 64 (Wyo. 1985))
(“This Court has previously held that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution grants an accused a right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to
chemical testing upon an arrest for DWUI.”).
199
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each of the Saldana factors.200 The Court specifically looked to the text of the
relevant constitutional provision and Wyoming’s pre-existing territorial law; then
the Court analyzed matters of state and local concern.201 Based on the Saldana
factors, the Court concluded Wyoming lacks the constitutional history to suggest
the framers of the Wyoming Constitution intended to provide greater rights
protections than the Federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.202 The Court also
did not find any special circumstances which would warrant granting broader
protection.203 Therefore, the Court found the Wyoming Constitution does not
provide a defendant with the right to counsel before deciding whether to submit
to chemical testing for blood alcohol.204
Despite cases like Vasquez and Mogard, the Wyoming Supreme Court frequently declined to address independent constitutional claims until 2005.205 Then,
in O’Boyle v. State, the Court referenced Vasquez and the independent interpretation of Wyoming’s search and seizure provision.206 It found a police officer
conducted an unreasonable warrantless search because he had not obtained the
defendant’s voluntarily consent.207 The Court explained that O’Boyle properly
raised a state constitutional claim under Vasquez, and thus it analyzed the state
constitutional claim first.208 The Court began its state constitutional analysis
by reiterating, “[o]ur state constitution provides protection of individual rights
See Mogard, ¶¶ 7–17, 32 P.3d at 315–19; Williams, supra note 7, at 178 (mentioning
Wyoming’s direct application of the neutral criteria approach in Mogard).
200

See Mogard, ¶¶ 7–17, 32 P.3d at 315 –19. The Court also referenced the Wyoming
convention debates and described the appellant’s use of the debates as a laudable effort. See id. ¶ 11,
316 –317.
201

202

Id. ¶ 29, 32 P.3d at 325.

203

Id. ¶ 30, 32 P.3d at 325.

204

See id. ¶ 31, 32 P.3d at 325.

See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶¶ 20–21, 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004)
(declining to undergo an independent constitutional analysis because the defendant “simply relies
on the decisions of other states in arguing for a broad interpretation of Wyoming’s constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures”); Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 10
n.2, 97 P.3d 781, 784 n.2 (Wyo. 2004) (rejecting the notion that merely indicating reliance on the
Wyoming Constitution is sufficient enough to undergo a state constitutional analysis).
205

206
See O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶¶ 26–27, 117 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2005) (mentioning
that “[s]ince Vasquez, we have not had the opportunity to consider a search and seizure claim
brought specifically under article 1 § 4”).

See id. ¶ 3, 117 P.3d at 404. Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement under
the Fourth Amendment. See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (discussing
the rules governing the voluntariness of a consent search).
207

O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 22, 117 P.3d at 408 (citing Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485 n.4
(Wyo. 1999)). “[S]tate constitutional analysis takes primacy—that is, the claim is analyzed first
under our state constitution.” O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 22; 117 P.3d at 408. However, the Court did not
elaborate on how O’Boyle’s state constitutional analysis satisfied the “precise and analytically sound
approach.” See id. The Court only mentioned that O’Boyle satisfied the criteria for raising a state
constitutional claim. See id.
208
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separate and independent from the protection afforded by the U.S. Constitu
tion.”209 It then discussed the non-exclusivity of the Saldana factors and
emphasized that a litigant does not need to address each factor to raise a state
constitutional claim.210 The Court also noted the textual language, textual
differences from the Federal Bill of Rights, and constitutional history factors were
all of little assistance in the search and seizure context.211 It did not elaborate
on why these factors were of little assistance, but only briefly mentioned that
there was not enough Wyoming constitutional history to provide guidance.212
The Court also mentioned it has not had the opportunity to fully consider the
scope of Wyoming’s search and seizure provision independent from the parallel
federal provision.213 In part, the Court reasoned it had not been able to consider
the scope because litigants either failed to raise claims properly or failed to raise
them at all.214 Ultimately, the Court stated litigants’ failures have forced it to
follow federal precedent regarding search and seizure rather than perform an
independent state constitutional analysis.215

Id. ¶ 23, 117 P.3d at 408. Though O’Boyle noted the Wyoming Constitution provides
separate and independent protection, the Court had previously been inconsistent in analyzing
the Wyoming Constitution independently. See, e.g., Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo.
1996); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993). The Court in O’Boyle also reasoned by “using
federal law as a guide, states may also conclude that the scope of the protection provided by their
constitution is the same as and parallel to that provided by the federal constitution.” See O’Boyle,
2005 WY ¶ 23, 117 P.3d at 408. The Court found the result in the case to be the same under both
the federal and state constitution but still reaffirmed the Wyoming Constitution’s separate and
independent protection. See id.
209

See O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 24 n.4, 117 P.3d at 408–09, 408 n.4. (“While state constitutional
claims need to be thoroughly briefed and discussed and the [Saldana factors] provide an appropriate
framework, those criteria are neither compulsory nor exclusive.”).
210

See id. at ¶ 24, 117 P.3d at 409. These factors were of little assistance except in relation to
the affidavit requirement in the Wyoming Constitution. See id.
211

See id.; see also Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1996) (noting the defendant’s
argument that Wyoming lacks the constitutional history to satisfy the Saldana factors). The lack of
assistance from these factors demonstrates the futility of the Court’s insistence on the neutral criteria
approach in order to develop an independent constitutional jurisprudence in Wyoming. See infra
notes 216–39, 322–41 and accompanying text.
212

213
O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 24, 117 P.3d at 409. The Court mentioned it only had a limited
opportunity to address the “reasonable under all the circumstances” test laid out in Vasquez. See id.
214
See id. at ¶ 27, 117 P.3d at 409 (listing more cases where the Court has declined to address
the state constitutional claim).
215
Id.; see also Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 12, 169 P.3d 538, 542–43 (Wyo. 2007)
(undergoing federal Fourth Amendment analysis due to inadequate briefing on a state constitutional
claim); Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005) (noting that the Court
usually declines to address state constitutional claims absent adequate briefing). See generally Mervin
Mecklenburg, Comment, Fixing O’Boyle v. State – Traffic Detentions Under Wyoming’s Emerging
Search-and-Seizure Standard, 7 Wyo. L. Rev. 69, 71, 95 (2007) (arguing the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s reasonableness rule after O’Boyle is “a mere pale cousin to its federal counterpart” and the
Court failed to create a “principled . . . body of state constitutional law” (citation omitted)).
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One year after O’Boyle, the Wyoming Supreme Court independently analyzed
another search and seizure issue under the Wyoming Constitution.216 In Johnson
v. State, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of police conducting inventory
searches of closed containers.217 When the Court addressed Johnson’s claim
for greater protection under the Wyoming Constitution, it reiterated the first
three factors from Saldana “are of little assistance.”218 The Court then quickly
analyzed the pre-existing state law factor from Saldana and revealed that since
at least 1976 Wyoming has allowed officers to open containers during inventory
searches.219 It also stated, since Johnson failed to provide analysis regarding
the structural differences between the Wyoming and Federal Constitutions,
the Court would not address his state constitutional claim.220 The Court then
indicated its review was limited to considering matters of state and local concern,
which was the only remaining Saldana factor.221 Under this factor, Johnson tried
to argue inventory searches hurt tourism in Wyoming because tourists do not
want police officers searching their rental cars if they are put into custody.222 The
Court rejected Johnson’s argument and held, in the context of inventory searches,
Wyoming’s search and seizure provision is the “same as and parallel to” the Fourth
Amendment.223 Therefore, the Court declined to afford greater protections under
the Wyoming Constitution and chose to follow federal precedent regarding
inventory searches.224
Later that same year, the Court decided Fertig v. State.225 In Fertig, the sole
issue was whether pretextual stops by police violated the Wyoming Constitution’s
search and seizure provision.226 The Court posited it was guided by the Saldana
216

See Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, 137 P.3d 903 (Wyo. 2006).

Id. ¶ 14, 137 P.3d at 906. Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement
under the Fourth Amendment, so police do not need to have individualized suspicion to search
through vehicles as part of a policy of routine administrative caretaking. See id. ¶¶ 13–17, 137 P.3d
at 906 –07.
217

See id. ¶ 20, 137 P.3d at 908 (citing O’Boyle at ¶ 24, 117 P.3d at 408–09); supra note 211
and accompanying text. Those factors again being the textual language of the state constitutional
provision, its differences from the federal parallel provision, and its constitutional history. See id.
Other than the affidavit requirement in the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure provision,
“[n]o further discussion of those factors is necessary.” Id. ¶ 20, 137 P.3d at 908.
218

219

See id.

220

See id.

221

See id.

222

See id. ¶¶ 21–22, 137 P.3d at 908.

Id. ¶ 24, 137 P.3d at 908. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of routine administrative
searches under the Federal Constitution).
223

224

Johnson, 2006 WY ¶ 24, 137 P.3d at 908.

225

Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 146 P.3d 492 (Wyo. 2006).

See id. ¶ 9, 146 P.3d at 495. Fertig conceded that pretextual stops by police were allowed
under the Federal Constitution but argued that Wyoming’s Constitution provides greater rights
226
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factors while again noting the first three factors were of little assistance.227 The
Court further stated the fifth factor—structural differences between the state and
federal constitutions—provided no assistance.228 Therefore, under Johnson and
Fertig, when litigants raise an independent state constitutional claim and argue
for greater protections under the Wyoming Constitution’s search and seizure
provision, only two of the six Saldana factors are of assistance.229 Those factors
are pre-existing state law and matters of local concern.230 Though the Court
acknowledged and analyzed these two remaining Saldana factors, its holding still
followed federal precedent and the Court ultimately found pretextual stops to
be constitutional.231
In 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not discuss the Saldana factors
or any other independent analytical framework when it considered an issue of
first impression in Hageman v. Goshen County School District.232 In Hageman,
the Court examined Wyoming’s search and seizure provision and upheld the
constitutional validity of administrative searches of school students.233 In its
analysis, the Court discussed Vasquez and O’Boyle and the “reasonable under all of
the circumstances” test.234 The Court recognized it previously found Wyoming’s

protections and does not allow for these types of stops. See id. ¶ 12, 146 P.3d at 496. “A pretextual
stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or
place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated crime for which they did not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop.” Id. ¶ 9, 146 P.3d at 495 (citing United States v. BoteroOspina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995)).
See id. ¶ 16, 146 P.3d at 497 (quoting O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶¶ 24–25, 117 P.3d
401, 408– 09 (Wyo. 2005)); supra notes 211, 218 and accompanying text.
227

See Fertig, 2006 WY ¶ 16, 146 P.3d at 497 (quoting Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 309
(1999)). Just as in Johnson, O’Boyle, and Vasquez, the Court’s statement in Fertig that these neutral
criteria factors are of little assistance is based on both the lack of Wyoming Constitutional history
and the minimal textual differences between the Wyoming Constitution’s Article 1 Section 4 and
the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See id. ¶¶ 15–16, 146 P.3d at 496–97; supra notes
187–93, 206 –24 and accompanying text.
228

229

See Fertig, 2006 WY ¶ 16, 146 P.3d at 497.

230

See id.

See id. ¶¶ 15–28, 146 P.3d at 497–501. The Court relied heavily on federal precedent
throughout its state constitutional analysis. See id.; see also Mecklenburg, supra note 215, at 95 n.190
(criticizing the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Fertig for overly relying on federal precedent
and “offer[ing] nothing more than a general acknowledgement of Wyoming case law”). See generally
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding pretextual stops are constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment).
231

See Hageman v. Goshen Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487 (Wyo. 2011). See
generally Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring). The appellants
in Hageman raised the constitutional claims solely under the Wyoming Constitution and argued for
greater protections while citing Vasquez and O’Boyle. See Hageman, 2011 WY ¶¶ 2, 6–9, 256 P.3d
at 490, 492.
232

233

See Hageman, 2011 WY ¶¶ 51–52, 256 P.3d at 503.

234

See id. ¶¶ 7–9, 256 P.3d at 492.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3

424

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

search and seizure provision to offer greater rights protections than the federal
analogue in other cases.235 However, the Court never mentioned the Saldana
factors and never undertook a truly independent state constitutional analysis
to determine whether school students in Wyoming have greater protections in
the administrative search context.236 Instead, the Court looked to federal and
other states’ case law as guidance.237 The Court then applied the “reasonable
under all of the circumstances” test with the same degree of protection as the
federal reasonableness test.238 Hageman demonstrates the Court’s trend toward
interpreting the Wyoming Constitution without fully analyzing its prior
independent jurisprudence and, instead, predominantly relying on federal law.239
In 2013, the Wyoming Supreme Court again interpreted the Wyoming
Constitution’s search and seizure provision without analyzing the Saldana factors
or its other recent independent jurisprudence.240 In Smith v. State, the main
issue was whether the statutorily mandated procedures for acquiring a remotely
communicated search warrant complied with the Wyoming Constitution’s affidavit
requirement.241 Unlike in Hageman, the Court in Smith acknowledged it has to
consider the greater protections under Wyoming’s search and seizure provision
when deciding on the issue.242 The Court specified the greater protection within
Wyoming’s search and seizure provision is that warrant applications require an
affidavit, which provides a permanent written record.243 After looking to several
other states’ case law, as well as federal case law, the Court held the statutory
procedures for remotely communicated search warrants complied with the

235

See id. ¶ 8, 256 P.3d at 492.

236

See id. ¶¶ 6 –52, 256 P.3d at 492–503.

See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624
(N.J. 2003).
237

238
See Hageman, 2011 WY ¶¶ 17–19, 256 P.3d at 495. The Court based its determination
of reasonableness on factors derived from U.S. Supreme Court precedent and stated “[t]his list of
factors is also consistent with Wyoming precedent.” See id. ¶¶ 18–19, 256 P.3d at 495 (citing Acton,
515 U.S. 646; Earls, 536 U.S. 822).

See generally Juliane Gern, Case Note, Constitutional Law – Students Shed Wyoming
Constitutional Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate: the Wyoming Supreme Court Upholds a Policy of Random,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students; Hageman v. Goshen County School District No. 1, 256 P.3d
487 (Wyo. 2011), 13 Wyo. L. Rev. 647 (2013) (criticizing the Wyoming Supreme Court for failing
to analyze the Saldana factors and for not granting greater rights protections to school students
under the Wyoming Constitution).
239

240

See Smith v. State, 2013 WY 122, 311 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2013).

See id. ¶ 2, 311 P.3d at 134.; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. The statutory procedures
allowed law enforcement to record the telephone conversation, request a warrant, and transcribe
that conversation into written form. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(d) (2019).
241

242

See Smith, 2013 WY ¶ 14, 311 P.3d at 136.

Id. (citing Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 8, 33 P.3d 142, 147 (Wyo. 2001); Vasquez v.
State, 990 P.2d 476, 483 (Wyo. 1999)).
243
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affidavit requirement in Wyoming’s search and seizure provision.244 Therefore, the
Court declined to extend greater rights protections through Wyoming’s affidavit
requirement in the context of remotely communicated search warrants.245
Though the Wyoming Supreme Court has occasionally undergone
independent constitutional analysis and granted greater rights protections, the
Court has generally declined to do so, especially in contexts outside of search and
seizure.246 In Kovach v. State, the appellant raised a claim under the Wyoming
Constitution arguing Wyoming’s due process provision imposes a greater duty on
prosecutors to disclose evidence to defense counsel.247 The Court found Kovach
“failed to articulate a separate and independent state constitutional basis for
imposing” a greater duty on prosecutors.248 Even so, the Court did address the
Saldana factors, but yet again largely dismissed each one as being unpersuasive
for granting greater rights protections under the Wyoming Constitution.249 The
Court ultimately choose to follow federal case law interpreting the due process
clause under the Federal Constitution and applied it to the Wyoming prosecutors’
failure to disclose evidence.250
Bear Cloud v. State is another example of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
reluctance to undergo an independent constitutional analysis outside of the
search and seizure context.251 In Bear Cloud, the Court declined to address a state

244

See id. ¶¶ 15–26, 311 P.3d at 136–40.

245

See id.

See, e.g., Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014) (declining
to analyze whether Wyoming’s cruel or unusual punishment provision offers greater protection);
Norgaard v. State, 2014 WY 157, ¶¶ 25–27, 339 P.3d 267, 274–75 (Wyo. 2014) (undergoing a
“cursory analysis” of cruel or unusual punishment without determining whether greater protections
applied (citing Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, ¶¶ 35–37, 61 P.3d 1234, 1249 (Wyo. 2003)); Kovach
v. State, 2013 WY 46, ¶¶ 44–54, 299 P.3d 97, 111–13 (Wyo. 2013) (undergoing an independent
constitutional analysis but declining to grant protections under Wyoming’s due process clause); see
also Hathaway v. State, 2017 WY 92, ¶ 14 n.1, 399 P.3d 625, 630 n.1 (Wyo. 2017) (declining to
undergo independent state constitutional analysis and determine whether Wyoming’s search and
seizure provision offers greater protections); State v. Deen, 2015 WY 5, ¶ 2 n.1, 340 P.3d 1036,
1038 n.1 (Wyo. 2015) (same); Engdahl v. State, 2014 WY 76, ¶ 11 n.1, 327 P.3d 114, 117 n.1
(Wyo. 2014) (same).
246

247
See Kovach, 2013 WY ¶ 44, 299 P.3d at 111; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 (“No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”).
248
See Kovach, 2013 WY ¶ 45, 299 P.3d at 111 (quoting O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83,
¶ 24, 117 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993)). The
Court did not indicate why Kovach failed to adequately raise an independent state constitutional
claim. See id. It only asserted, without elaboration, that it applied the Saldana factors and concluded
Kovach failed. See id.
249

See id. ¶¶ 45, 49–54, 299 P.3d at 111–13. The Court briefly analyzed each Saldana factor.

See id.
250

See id. ¶¶ 46–48, 54, 299 P.3d at 111, 113.

251

See Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014).
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constitutional claim of cruel or unusual punishment.252 It stated Bear Cloud’s
analysis only made a “passing reference” to the Wyoming Constitution, and since
this was not the proper analytic form, it chose to analyze the case under the
Federal Constitution.253 The Court also quoted Saldana saying, “it is not the
function of this court to frame appellant’s argument or draw his issues for him,”
and further stated it “adopt[s]” Justice Golden’s advice in his Saldana concurrence
that the Court will decline a state constitutional claim when a litigant does not
properly brief the issue.254
In one rare instance outside the criminal procedure context, the Wyoming
Supreme Court found an appellant properly briefed a state free exercise of
religion claim.255 In Neely v. Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct &
Ethics, a municipal judge and part-time circuit court magistrate expressed her
refusal to perform same-sex marriage ceremonies in an interview with the local
paper, citing sincere religious beliefs.256 This case presented the issue of whether
Judge Neely’s pronouncement of her religious beliefs could subject her to court
discipline.257 Writing for the majority, Justice Kate Fox recognized that Judge
Neely adequately briefed her claim for independent state constitutional analysis.258

252

See id.

Id. “Mr. Bear Cloud’s entire argument relating to the Wyoming Constitution consisted of:
‘Wyoming’s State Constitution can provide greater protections that [sic] the federal constitution
and Wyoming does so by analyzing the two words cruel and unusual separately.” Id. ¶ 14 n.4,
334 P.3d at 137 n.4 (citing Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9 ¶ 35, 61 P.3d 1234, 1249 (Wyo. 2003);
Sampsell v. State, 2001 WY ¶¶ 10 –11, 17 P.3d 724, 727–28 (Wyo. 2001)).
253

Id. ¶ 14, 334 P.3d at 137 (quoting Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993)
(Golden, J., concurring)).
254

See Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶¶ 39–40, 390
P.3d 728, 741–42 (Wyo. 2017); see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 18; Wyo. Const. art. 21, § 25.
The Court does not specifically mention what made Judge Neely’s independent state constitutional
claim adequate. See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 39–43, 390 P.3d at 741–43. However, the Court did
discuss how Neely pointed to the text of the relevant constitutional provisions and supported her
argument with the debates of the Wyoming constitutional convention. See id. In addition to Neely,
the Court also found other briefs arguing for independent analysis to be appropriate around this
time. See Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, ¶ 18, 430 P.3d 766, 770 (Wyo. 2018) (finding that
the defendant “present[ed] a well-developed argument that the state constitution provides even
greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the federal constitution.”);
Nicodemus v. State, 2017 WY 34, ¶¶ 31–32, ¶ 31 n.3, 392 P.3d 408, 416, 416 n.3 (Wyo. 2017)
(finding the appellant properly framed his brief on cruel or unusual punishment).
255

256

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 4 –14, 390 P.3d at 733–35.

Id. ¶ 2, 390 P.3d at 732. For a full analysis of the disciplinary issues presented in Neely,
see Keeley O. Cronin, Note, Judicial Ethics – Judicial Words May Speak Softer Than Actions, But
They Do Still Speak: The Code of Judicial Conduct; Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct &
Ethics, 2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728 (Wyo. 2017), 18 Wyo. L. Rev. 81 (2018).
257

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶ 40, 390 P.3d at 741– 42. Despite recognizing the religious liberty
claim as adequately raised, Justice Fox also noted that Judge Neely had failed to adequately raise a
separate free speech claim under the Wyoming Constitution. See id. ¶ 40 n.9, 390 P.3d at 742 n.9.
258
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However, even though the state constitutional claim was adequately raised, Justice
Fox still addressed the federal claim first.259 When Justice Fox performed her
independent analysis, she also did not explicitly discuss the Saldana factors.260
Justice Fox began the state constitutional analysis in Neely by asserting that
the Court follows principles of statutory interpretation when construing
provisions within the Wyoming Constitution.261 She stated the central purpose of
doing so is to determine the intent of the framers.262 Justice Fox then referenced
Wyoming’s constitutional convention debates, and mentioned other states’
findings of greater protections under their own religion clauses.263 She found
the Wyoming religion clauses “may offer broader protections” than the Federal
Constitution, but the issue of granting greater rights protections does not apply
in this case.264 Specifically, Justice Fox reasoned Judge Neely’s religious belief and
sentiment was not the focus of the State’s disciplinary action against her and,
therefore, the Wyoming Constitution’s religion clauses do not apply.265 Thus, the
majority of the Court held the State had not violated the Wyoming Constitution’s
religion clauses.266
After reaching the holding on the inapplicability of the Wyoming Constitu
tion’s religion clauses, Justice Fox continued to undergo a more generalized
independent constitutional analysis in Neely.267 Specifically, Justice Fox examined
the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights in pari materia.268 She also
quoted another principle of statutory interpretation explaining the Court will not
render other provisions of the Wyoming Constitution “inoperative or superfluous”
by allowing one right to trump another.269 While applying these principles, Justice

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 16 –17, 39–50, 390 P.3d at 735, 741– 44. Sequentially, analyzing
the federal claim first is inconsistent with Vasquez’s statement that the Court should independently
analyze state constitutional issues first. See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485– 86 (Wyo. 1999); see
also O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 22, 117 P.3d 401, 408 (“[S]tate constitutional analysis takes
primacy . . . .” (citation omitted)).
259

260

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 39–50, 390 P.3d at 741–44.

261

Id. ¶ 41, 390 P.3d at 742.

262

Id. (citing Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 39, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065 (Wyo. 2004)).

263

See id. ¶¶ 43– 46, 390 P.3d at 742– 43 (citations omitted).

264

Id. ¶ 42, 390 P.3d at 742.

265

Id.

266

See id. ¶ 46, 390 P.3d at 743. The holding in Neely was split 3–2. See generally id.

267

See id. ¶ 47, 390 P.3d at 744.

See id. (“[E]very statement in the constitution must be interpreted in light of the entire
document, with all portions thereof read in pari materia.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 40, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065– 66 (Wyo. 2004)).
268

See Neely, at ¶ 49, 390 P.3d at 744 (quoting Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 520
(Wyo. 2000)).
269
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Fox emphasized the great importance the Wyoming Constitution places on equal
rights by citing several provisions within the Declaration of Rights as support.270
Justice Fox’s discussion of the Declaration of Rights within Neely is a good example
of an independent constitutional analysis that the Wyoming Supreme Court has
rarely undertaken.271
Sheesley v. State is the most recent case where the Wyoming Supreme
Court expressed a strong willingness to independently interpret the Wyoming
Constitution.272 In Sheesley, the appellant was the manager of an adult community
correctional facility and she engaged in a sexual relationship with a resident.273
While reserving her right to appeal, Sheesley pled guilty to third degree sexual
assault.274 Sheesley challenged the constitutionality of the sexual assault statute
and argued it violated her substantive due process rights under the Wyoming
and Federal Constitutions.275 Addressing the Wyoming constitutional argument,
Justice Fox, writing for a unanimous court, stated that Sheesley failed to
adequately brief her state constitutional claim.276 The Court then tried to clarify
what a litigant must do to raise a claim under the Wyoming Constitution.277 It
explained the Court subscribes to the view that state constitutions should be used
as a “font of individual liberties,” additional to the Federal Constitution.278 In this

270
See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 47– 48, 390 P.3d at 744; see also Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 2 (“In
their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race
are created equal.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3 (“Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil
rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights
and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or
condition whatsoever . . . .”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.”); Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 19 (“No money of the state shall
ever be given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or institution.”); Johnson v. State
Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing the greater protections within
Wyoming’s multiple equal protection clauses).

See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 39–53, 390 P.3d at 741–46; see also supra notes 121–254 and
accompanying text. Neely is also an important example of the Court applying the traditional
methods of constitutional interpretation to the Wyoming Constitution, that being the principles of
statutory construction. See Neely, 2017 WY ¶¶ 39–53, 390 P.3d at 741–46. See generally Rasmussen
v. Baker, 50 P. 819 (Wyo. 1897).
271

272
See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, 437 P.3d 830 (Wyo. 2019). Sheesley is also the most
recent teaching opinion by the Wyoming Supreme Court educating litigants about the possibilities
of raising a state constitutional claim. See id.; supra note 39 and accompanying text.
273

See Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 2, 437 P.3d at 832.

274

See id.; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(viii) (2019).

275

See Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 1, 437 P.3d at 832.

See id. ¶ 13, 437 P.3d at 836. Even if the claim was found to be adequate, the Court only
addressed the state constitutional claim after it fully analyzed the federal claim. See id. ¶¶ 12–13,
437 P.3d at 836.
276

277
See id. ¶ 13, 437 P.3d at 832 (“[W]e take this opportunity to clarify what is and is not
required of litigants raising claims under the Wyoming Constitution.”).
278

See id. ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 832 (quoting Brennan, supra note 7, at 491).
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discussion, the Court quoted O’Boyle, Vasquez, and Saldana, noting the Court
has repeatedly reminded litigants of the independent protection afforded by the
Wyoming Constitution.279 The Court then firmly stated, once again, it is willing
to independently interpret the Declaration of Rights.280
After the Wyoming Supreme Court expressed its enthusiasm to undergo
independent state constitutional interpretations, the Court proceeded to discuss
the Saldana factors.281 It emphasized that there is no requirement to address
each Saldana factor and then explicitly rejected the notion that the Court
requires a “rigid analytical approach” to independently interpret the Wyoming
Constitution.282 However, the Court does require “proper argument and briefing
using a precise and analytically sound approach . . . .”283 The Court explained the
purpose of the requirement “is to provide assistance, not to create obstacles to
state constitutional analysis.”284 Additionally, though the Court does not require
discussion of all the Saldana factors, it will likely require discussion of some of
the factors, along with the proper authority to support them.285
After discussing the desired methodology for raising state constitutional
claims, the Court primarily addressed the form rather than the substance of
Sheesley’s state constitutional argument.286 It found the argument was “more akin
to ‘a grudging parallel citation to a state constitution that seeks merely to sidestep
review by the United States Supreme Court.’”287 The Court further mentioned
Sheesley’s state constitutional argument was similar to her federal constitutional
argument and that it failed to include any analysis of the Saldana factors.288 It did
acknowledge Sheesley’s identification of relevant Wyoming precedent; however,
the Court did not agree with Sheesley’s substantive reading of it.289 Overall, the

See id. ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 832 (citations omitted); O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117
P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604
(Wyo. 1993).
279

See Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 836 (quoting Saldana, 846 P.2d at 624 (Golden,
J., concurring)).
280

281

See id. ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 836 –37.

See id.; see also id. ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 837 (“Litigants need not engage in a rigid, formulaic
analysis to convince us to consider independent state constitutional grounds.”).
282

283

Id. (citing O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 22, 117 P.3d at 408).

284

Id. ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 838.

Id. (citing Keiter, supra note 2). The Court also noted this type of analysis would be part
of “[a] precise and analytically sound approach to state constitutional interpretation . . . .” Sheesley,
2019 WY ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 837.
285

286

See id. ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 837–38.

Id. ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 837 (quoting Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 623 (Wyo. 1993)
(Golden, J., concurring)).
287

288

Id.

289

See id. ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 837–38.
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Court concluded Sheesley did not provide “‘well founded legal reasons’ justifying
resort to independent state grounds” and it would not consider substantive due
process under the Wyoming Constitution in this case.290 The Court’s analysis in
Sheesley ultimately demonstrates its insistence on the use of the Saldana factors
as the proper analytic form to raise independent state constitutional claims.291
The analysis also shows the Court’s use of the Saldana factors to once again
decline addressing independent state constitutional claims or grant greater rights
protections under the Wyoming Constitution.292
History demonstrates that the Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed its
willingness to undergo independent state constitutional analysis and potentially
grant litigants greater rights protections.293 However, the Court has still frequently declined to address state constitutional claims and now cites to Sheesley,
and its discussion of analytic form, as a justification to do so.294 Regardless, many
recent opinions have provided litigants the opportunity to raise independent
state constitutional claims and have helped the Wyoming Supreme Court give
independent meaning to the Wyoming Constitution.295

IV. The Court Should Reject the Factor
Rigid Briefing Requirement of Saldana

and

The Wyoming Supreme Court has largely failed to undertake and
develop truly independent constitutional jurisprudence.296 The resurgent interest
in state constitutions during the 1970s and 1980s led the Court to insist that

Id. ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 838. Justice Fox also mentioned despite the outcome of this case,
“[t]he scope of substantive due process protections under the Wyoming Constitution remains an
open question, despite textual similarity between it and the federal constitution.” Id. ¶ 16 n.7, 437
P.3d at 838 n.7.
290

291

See id. ¶¶ 13 –16, 437 P.3d at 836 –38.

292

See id.; see supra notes 174–85, 216–31, 246–54 and accompanying text.

Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 836; Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993)
(Golden, J., concurring).
293

294
See Miller v. State, 2020 WY 30, ¶ 2 n.2, 459 P.3d 430, 432 n.2 (Wyo. 2020); Hardman
v. State, 2020 WY 11, ¶ 33 n.10, 456 P.3d 1223, 1231 n.10 (Wyo. 2020) (finding the appellant
“presented no analysis to support an independent examination of the Wyoming Constitution’s due
process or confrontation provisions. Therefore, we will not apply a separate analysis inconsistent
to the federal constitution.” (citing Sheesely, 2020 WY ¶ 16, 437 P.3d at 838; Bear Cloud v.
State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014)); Dixon v. State, 2019 WY 37, ¶ 18,
438 P.3d 216, 226 (Wyo. 2019); Mathewson v. State, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 18, 438 P.3d 189, 200
(Wyo. 2019) (stating the “failure to analyze any of the six non-exclusive Saldana criteria justifies
our foregoing any independent state constitutional analysis” (quoting Sheesley, 2020 WY ¶¶ 15–16,
437 P.3d at 837)).
295
See Sheesley, 2019 WY at ¶¶ 13–14, 437 P.3d at 836; see supra note 255 and accompanying text.
296

See supra notes 126–295 and accompanying text.
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litigants raise “precise, analytically sound” claims or it will refuse to independently
analyze the Wyoming Constitution.297 In a general sense, the desire for well
analyzed claims is justifiable.298 However, the Court has insisted on the use of a
combination of the “precise and analytically sound” approach with the neutral
criteria approach, which has evolved into a rigid briefing and presentation
requirement that most litigants fail to meet.299 Since the Court settled on this
combined approach in Vasquez, the Court has specifically fixated on the neutral
criteria quoted by Justice Golden in his Saldana concurrence.300 By insisting on
and applying these Saldana factors, the Court has created a state constitutional
jurisprudence which inherently lacks truly independent analysis.301 The lack of
independent analysis is due to the neutral criteria’s relational focus on the Federal
Constitution.302 The Court’s fixation on the Saldana factors has also hindered
the development of Wyoming’s independent constitutional law because it
elevates analytic form over substance and creates obstacles for litigants to
effectively raise independent state constitutional claims.303 Therefore, to move

297
See Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992) (citation omitted); supra notes
121–42 and accompanying text.
298

See Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 909.

See supra notes 161– 65, 188–97 and accompanying text; see also Vasquez v. State, 990
P.2d 476, 486 (Wyo. 1999); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621–24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J.,
concurring). In other words, the only precise and analytically sound approach the Court has
accepted as a means of raising an independent state constitutional claim is the neutral criteria
approach. See, e.g., Mathewson v. State, 2019 WY 36, ¶18, 438 P.3d 189, 200 (Wyo. 2019);
Hathaway v. State, 2017 WY 92, ¶ 14 n.1, 399 P.3d 625, 630 n.1 (Wyo. 2017); see also Sheesley,
2019 WY ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 837 (holding the neutral criteria approach is part of a “precise and
analytically sound” approach).
299

300
See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 486; Saldana, 846 P.2d 604, 621–24 (Golden, J., concurring)
(quoting State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986)); supra notes 188–97, 246–54, 272–92
and accompanying text; see also Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, 32 P.3d 313 (Wyo.
2001) (applying directly the neutral criteria approach); Williams, supra note 7, at 178 (mentioning
the Wyoming Supreme Court settled on the neutral criteria approach in Vasquez). The Court
has insisted so strongly on the neutral criteria since Saldana that its insistence is a fixation. See
supra notes 246–54, 272–92 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 151–52
(discussing the Washington Supreme Court’s counterproductive fixation on the neutral criteria
from Gunwall).
301
See infra notes 305 –21 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 142; An
Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550.
302
See infra notes 305 –21 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 142; An
Essay on Wyoming Consitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550. The neutral criteria approach
is also a relational or comparative approach because it centers on analyzing the differences between
the Federal Constitution and a state constitution in determining whether to undergo independent
constitutional analysis. See Williams, supra note 7, at 148.
303
See supra notes 174–295 and accompanying text. Though the Court in Sheesley directly
stated the “[precise and analytically sound] requirement’s purpose is to provide assistance, not to
create obstacles to state constitutional analysis[,]” in effect, the requirement has created obstacles to
independent constitutional analysis. See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 15, 437 P.3d 830, 837
(Wyo. 2019); infra notes 329–41 and accompanying text.
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forward and develop a more truly independent constitutional jurisprudence,
the Wyoming Supreme Court should reject both the Saldana factors and its
insistence on a rigid briefing and presentation requirement.304
A state court’s use of neutral criteria to justify deviation from federal
interpretations of the Federal Constitution is a relational approach.305 The
neutral criteria approach is relational because its focus at each step is defined by
the Federal Constitution in comparison to a state constitution.306 The relational
emphasis is evidenced by the fact the neutral criteria only allows courts to “resort”
to independent state constitutional analysis.307 When a litigant does manage to
conform to a court’s preferred briefing standard and the court actually undergoes
a state constitutional analysis, the focus of the court’s opinion tends to be on
the justifications for deviating from federal precedent rather than on “a reasoned
elaboration of state constitutional doctrine.”308 Thus, all independent analysis
looks “result-oriented” and the court also appears to supplant the U.S. Supreme
Court’s views for its own.309 Therefore, a lack of independent state constitutional
analysis is inherent in the neutral criteria approach.310
In Vasquez v. State, Justice Golden briefly considered multiple methodol
ogies to independent state constitutional analysis but found the only suitable
methodology was for the Court to address the state constitutional claim first.311 He

304

See infra notes 305–44 and accompanying text.

305

See Williams, supra note 7, at 148.

Id. (“Under this approach, a state court is compelled to focus on the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s
decision and to explain, in terms of the identified criteria, why it is not following Supreme Court
precedent.” (citing Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation
of the State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 318 (1977)).
306

307
See supra notes 37– 47, 290 and accompanying text; see also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d
808, 811–12 (Wash. 1986); Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶16, 437 P.3d 830, 838 (Wyo. 2019);
Williams, supra note 7, at 138.
308

Williams, supra note 7, at 137; see also supra notes 186–254 and accompanying text.

See O’Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 24 n.4, 117 P.3d 401, 408 n.4 (Wyo. 2005) (citation
omitted); Sutton, supra note 22, at 65 (“A state court does not amplify the independent nature of
a state constitutional guarantee merely by taking sides on a debate about the meaning of a federal
guarantee . . . .”); Williams, supra note 7, at 150 (quoting State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813
(Wash. 1986)).
309

See supra notes 186 –295 and accompanying text. This is not to say the Wyoming Supreme
Court should follow the lock-step approach, especially given that the Court has repeatedly stated it
will not “blindly follow” federal interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bear
Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604,
621 (Wyo. 1993) (Macy, J., specially concurring).
310

311
See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485– 86 (Wyo. 1999) (determining that independently
addressing the state constitutional issue first “best suits our decision that we must further develop
our own constitutional principles under the state provision by consideration of constitutional theory
appropriate to this state”); see also O’Boyle, 2005 WY ¶ 22, 117 P.3d at 408 (expressing that when
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rejected a lock-step approach, reasoning, “development of sound constitutional
principles would obviously not be workable” by deciding to explicitly follow
parallel federal precedents.312 Additionally, he rejected the methodology of
deciding whether a claim first fails under the Federal Constitution before
addressing a state claim.313 The methodology of looking to the state constitution
only after fully analyzing a claim under the Federal Constitution is also known
as the “interstitial approach.”314 Justice Golden rejected this approach because it
was likely to be criticized as “result-oriented.”315 Despite his determination that
analyzing a state constitutional claim first is the appropriate methodology for
Wyoming, Justice Golden still analyzed the federal claim first and largely applied
the interstitial approach.316
Many courts which use the interstitial approach have also used the neutral
criteria approach as part of their methodology.317 The Wyoming Supreme Court
is no exception—the Court has often applied a mix of the interstitial and neutral
criteria approaches.318 Skeptics may criticize both approaches for being “result-

a litigant raises a state constitutional claim, the “state constitutional analysis takes primacy—that
is, the claim is analyzed first under our state constitution” (citing Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485 n.4));
Sutton, supra note 22, at 178– 81 (discussing how analyzing state claims first helps state courts
maintain “the rightful independence of their state constitutions” (citations omitted)).
312

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485–86.

313

See id.

See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 548–50; Utter
& Pitler, supra note 22, at 648–51. The underlying premise of the interstitial approach is the
presumption of validity, or presumption of correctness, regarding federal constitutional analysis
under state constitutions. See Williams, supra note 7, at 136–38, 142 (calling this presumption the
“mistaken premise”); Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 650. Critics believe the interstitial approach
is result-oriented because it only seeks to determine whether the state court should supplement
or amplify federal constitutional rights under the state constitution. See Williams, supra note 7,
at 137–38; Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 648–51. Critics will always argue an approach is
result-oriented when a state court makes the Federal Constitution the starting point of the analysis,
regardless of what specific methodology the court uses. See id. at 136–37.
314

315
Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 485– 86; see Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 650 –51 (discussing
how the interstitial, also known as the supplemental, approach can be considered result-oriented
(citations omitted)); see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 181 (“By deciding the federal claim first,
state courts do most what one would expect them to do least: aggrandize federal law at the expense
of state law.”); An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 549–50 (noting
the primary argument against the interstitial approach is it “impedes the development of an
independent state constitutional tradition”).
316

See Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 480–82, 486.

See Williams, supra note 7, at 142; see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 182 (criticizing the
interstitial approach while also quoting the New Mexico Supreme Court’s neutral criteria approach
(quoting State v. Sanchez, 2015–NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 2015 N.M. 152, 350 P.3d 1169, 1174
N.M. 2015)).
317

An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 550 (observing the
Wyoming Supreme Court has tended to follow the interstitial approach); see, e.g., Sheesley v. State,
2019 WY 32, 437 P.3d 830 (Wyo. 2019); Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics,
318
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oriented” because, in applying these approaches, it appears the Court reaches a
holding only based on its preferred result.319 The “result-oriented” criticism is due
to both approaches’ initial and overall relational focus on the Federal Constitution
rather than independently analyzing the state constitution.320 Therefore, despite
Justice Golden’s goal of developing sound constitutional principles for Wyoming,
the Wyoming Supreme Court’s use of the neutral criteria from Vasquez and
Saldana has largely only developed an interstitial methodology and not a truly
independent constitutional jurisprudence.321
Originally, multiple state courts adopted a neutral criteria approach as
a challenge to the legitimacy of independent state constitutionalism.322 The
approach sought to guide or limit the courts, and thus constrain their ability
to develop independent constitutional law.323 After the Washington Supreme
Court adopted the neutral criteria in State v. Gunwall, the neutral criteria
approach began to impede the development of Washington’s independent state
constitutional law.324 Commentators have noted, in a number of cases over
the years, the Washington Supreme Court appears to have declined to address
various important state constitutional claims.325 Dissenters on the Washington
Supreme Court often argued the majority’s insistence on the neutral criteria
approach was elevating form over substance.326 Other justices from states which
have adopted a neutral criteria approach have also criticized the elevation of form

2017 WY 25, 390 P.3d 728 (Wyo. 2017); Kovach v. State, 2013 WY 46, 299 P.3d 97 (Wyo. 2013);
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999); supra notes 188–231, 255–92 and accompanying
text. Throughout its jurisprudence the Wyoming Supreme Court has also followed a variety of
different methodologies. See An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at
542 (mentioning the methodologies taken by state courts have not been exclusive, “in most states
we can readily discern evidence of [multiple] approach[es] to constitutional interpretation”).
319

See Williams, supra note 7, at 137–38, 182; Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 650–51.

320

See Williams, supra note 7, at 137–38, 182; Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 650–51.

See An Essay on Wyoming Consitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 549 (“The
fear is that if state courts must always initially look to federal precedent, they will forever find
themselves influenced by Supreme Court precedent and unable to construct a fully independent
jurisprudence.”); see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 182– 83 (criticizing the interstitial approach for
leading state courts to overly rely on federal constitutional law).
321

322

See Williams, supra note 7, at 138; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.

323

See Williams, supra note 7, at 130, 138.

324

See id. at 151–54; supra notes 37– 47 and accompanying text.

325

See Williams, supra note 7, at 152–53 (citation omitted).

See Williams, supra note 7, at 153 –54; see also State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514, 537
(Wash. 1996) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “elevate[s] form over substance
and . . . unjustly den[ies] the defendant the protections he deserves as a Washington State citizen”);
Richmond v. Thompson, 922 P.2d 1343, 1355 (Wash. 1996) (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (“The
court need not fulfill every—or any—Gunwall factor to justify a broader reading of a parallel state
constitutional provision.” (citation omitted)).
326
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over substance.327 Ultimately, the Gunwall factors have constrained state courts’
ability to develop independent state constitutional law.328
Like Washington and other neutral criteria states, the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s fixation on the use of this analytic form has hindered Wyoming’s
independent constitutional analysis.329 Though the Court often says the
Saldana factors are not exclusive and other types of constitutional arguments
are acceptable if the arguments are “precise and analytically sound,” the Court
has rarely discussed a state constitutional claim without reference to the Saldana
factors.330 Justice Golden, who originally advocated for the Gunwall factors in
Saldana and adopted in Vasquez, emphasized the Court would not address most
state constitutional claims without adherence to this preferred analytical form
in briefs and presentations.331 The Court has declined to address a multitude of
state constitutional claims due to litigants’ failures in briefing and in presentation,
despite litigants having actually asserted state constitutional claims and having
actually argued for independent state constitutional analysis.332 However, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed its desire for litigants to raise more state
constitutional claims in hopes of developing Wyoming’s constitutional law.333
327
See Williams, supra note 7, at 154, 156–57, 162 (discussing cases where the dissent has
argued the neutral criteria approach elevates form over substance); see also State v. Hill, 675 A.2d
866, 882– 83 (Conn. 1996) (Norcott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Phyllis W. Beck, Foreward:
Stepping Over the Procedural Threshold in the Presentation of State Constitutional Claims, 68 Temp. L.
Rev. 1035, 1038–39 (1995) (“[A] litigant seeking to enlarge the rights of the individual, via state
constitutional law, [should] be free from a technical procedure that may not always serve to advance
the inquiry at hand.”).

See supra notes 45– 47 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 162
(“[T]he criteria approach seems to have taken on a ‘life of its own’ in state constitutional law
cases . . . and possibly has actually been counterproductive.” (citations omitted)).
328

329

See supra notes 174–295 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 174–295 and accompanying text. If the Saldana factors, or the case itself,
are not explicitly mentioned during the Court’s constitutional discussion, the Court still tends to
cite other cases that have discussed them. Thus, the Saldana factors almost always have an indirect
presence in these cases. See, e.g., Engdahl v. State, 2014 WY 76, ¶ 11 n.1, 327 P.3d 114, 117 n.1
(Wyo. 2014); Phippen v. State, 2013 WY 30, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 104, 108 (Wyo. 2013); Cotton v. State,
2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005).
330

331

See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622–24 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).

See supra notes 174–85, 214, 246, 294 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Lovato v.
State, 901 P.2d 408, 413 (Wyo. 1995) (declining the opportunity to undergo an independent
constitutional analysis because the “[a]ppellant did little more than quote the relevant Wyoming
constitutional provisions and provide some general analysis of Wyoming due process law. Absent
a more complete and specific analysis of the constitutional language and its history, we refuse to
consider Appellant’s state constitutional arguments”); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14,
334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014); Mathewson v. State, 2019 WY 36, ¶ 18, 438 P.3d 189, 200
(Wyo. 2019).
332

See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 830, 836 (Wyo. 2019); O’Boyle v.
State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 23, 117 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2005); Dworkin v. LFP, Inc., 839 P.2d 903,
909 (Wyo. 1992).
333
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But, because of the Court’s fixation on the neutral criteria approach and a “precise
and analytically sound” form, it is unlikely litigants will be able to successfully
raise more independent state constitutional claims.334
In Sheesley v. State, Justice Fox assured litigants that the Court’s requirements
for raising an independent state constitutional claim are “to provide assistance,
not to create obstacles to state constitutional analysis.”335 But the Court’s
requirements have done little to assist litigants, and it is often unclear what the
Court actually requires given it has rarely expounded on what a proper form of
state constitutional analysis should look like under its approach.336 Despite Justice
Fox’s assurances, the Court has cited Sheesley multiple times as a justification to
deny addressing state constitutional claims.337 Additionally, other state courts
adopted the neutral criteria approach to constrain and limit independent state
constitutional analysis.338 The Saldana factors, Wyoming’s neutral criteria
approach, have limited independent constitutional analysis by imposing a rigid
analytic form of argument which the Court has elevated over substance.339
This rigid analytic form prevented Wyoming courts from addressing litigants’
state constitutional claims in numerous instances.340 Therefore, in effect, the

334

See infra notes 335–41 and accompanying text.

335

See Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶ 15, 437 P.3d at 837.

See supra notes 136 –295 and accompanying text. The Court frequently declines
independent state constitutional claims without articulating why a litigant has failed to raise an
independent claim and without demonstrating what an appropriate independent analysis would
look like. See, e.g., Engdahl v. State, 2014 WY 76, ¶ 11 n.1, 327 P.3d 114, 117 n.1 (Wyo. 2014); Bear
Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014); see also Gronski v. State, 910
P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo. 1996) (rejecting a litigant’s argument that the Saldana factors are not a suitable
analytical technique for independent constitutional analysis under the Wyoming Constitution).
Additionally, there are procedural requirements to assert independent state constitutional claims that
add a layer of difficulty. See Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶¶ 12–13, 169 P.3d 538, 542–53 (Wyo.
2007) (discussing the need to raise an adequate independent state constitutional claim at the district
court level (quoting Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶¶ 11–12, 135 P.3d 620, 623–24 (Wyo. 2006));
Harvey v. Wyo. Dep’t. of Transp., 2011 WY 72, ¶ 8, 250 P.3d 167, 171 (Wyo. 2011) (requiring an
appellant argue for greater protection under the specific circumstances of their case or else the Court
will decline to address the claim); Phippen v. State, 2013 WY 30, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 104, 108 (Wyo.
2013) (requiring litigants to raise an adequate and separate Wyoming Constitutional claim when
presenting an issue to the district court, as well as requiring an independent and supporting analysis
to articulate how the Wyoming Constitution provides greater rights protections).
336

337
See Sheesley, 2019 WY ¶15, 437 P.3d at 836 –37 (assuring litigants that the court does not
require a rigid analytical approach to make it undergo independent constitutional interpretation);
supra note 294 and accompanying text.
338

See Williams, supra note 7, at 138, 150; supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 174–295 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at
151–53 (discussing how the “rigidity and limiting effect of the criteria were predictable”); An Essay
on Wyoming Consitutional Interpretation, supra note 22, at 548–50 (discussing how the interstitial
methodology hinders independent state constitutional development).
339

340

See supra notes 174 –295 and accompanying text.
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Saldana factors and the “precise and analytically sound” approach have hindered
Wyoming’s independent constitutional development.341
The Wyoming Supreme Court should reject the neutral criteria approach
Justice Golden provided in Saldana and which the Court officially adopted in
Vasquez.342 The Court’s use of these factors has narrowed the focus of the Court
away from the substance of the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights
and placed more focus onto the Federal Constitution.343 Additionally, the Court’s
strong insistence on a “precise and analytically sound” form only further impedes
the Court’s development of Wyoming’s constitutional jurisprudence because
it creates obstacles which make it unlikely for litigants to successfully raise
independent state constitutional claims.344

V. A Traditional Approach to Interpretation
of the Declaration of Rights
The Wyoming Supreme Court should accept state constitutional claims
when litigants base their arguments for independent constitutional analysis
on traditional methods of constitutional interpretation.345 Specifically, the
Court should address a state constitutional claim if a litigant, at a minimum,
includes a discussion of the relevant text of the right asserted, uses traditional
principles of constitutional interpretation, and supports the discussion with
legitimate sources.346 Early in its history, the Court independently interpreted the

341
See supra notes 174 –295 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note 7, at 150–53
(“[I]ndependent state constitutional analysis is lost somewhere in the ever-shifting shadow of the
federal courts which are no less political and perhaps more so than our own state courts.” (quoting
State v. Gocken, 896 P.2d 1267, 1275– 81 (Wash. 1995) (Madsen, J., concurring)); An Essay on
Wyoming Consitutional Interpretation; supra note 22, at 548–50.
342
See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 486 (Wyo. 1999); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622
(Wyo. 1993).
343
See Mecklenburg, supra note 215, at 94–95 (criticizing the Wyoming Supreme Court in
O’Boyle for failing to ground its independent analysis on legal doctrines derived from Wyoming case
law and for focusing too much on federal law); supra notes 174–295, 305–21 and accompanying
text; see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 177 (mentioning that “exclusive (or even heavy) reliance
on debates about the meaning of a federal guarantee is not apt to dignify the state constitutions as
independent sources of law”).
344

See supra notes 329–41 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 64–120 and accompanying text; see also State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT
49, ¶ 37, 162 P.3d 1106, 1114–15 (Utah 2007) (discussing traditional methods of state
constitutional analysis).
345

Legitimate legal sources include relevant state case law, supporting case law from sister
states, appropriate secondary sources like Robert B Keiter’s The Wyoming State Constitution (2d.
edition), and reference to federal case law only for general guidance. See also Tiedemann, 2007 UT
¶ 37, 162 P.3d at 1114 –15; Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶¶ 11–13, 171 P.3d 525, 530–31 (Wyo.
2007) (accepting a state constitutional claim based on a discussion of the relevant text, case law, and
analysis under an independent Wyoming constitutional standard).
346
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Declaration of Rights using the traditional principles of statutory construction.347
In more recent cases, the Court has continued to discuss the Declaration of
Rights using these same principles.348 The Court has also expressed that the
Wyoming Constitution is not a static document and courts should interpret
it pragmatically to meet the needs of a progressive society.349 These traditional
principles of constitutional interpretation, along with support from recent
cases and a standard which encourages substance over form, can all support
the Court and litigants in developing a new tradition of independent constitutional jurisprudence.350
An example is State v. Tiedemann, where the Utah Supreme Court expounded
on what is required for an independent state constitutional analysis.351 The State
asserted the defendant failed to adequately brief his state constitutional claim,
citing a neutral criteria approach the Utah Supreme Court applied in a prior
case.352 The Utah Supreme Court determined the State’s claim involved a
“fundamental misconception” about state constitutional law and decided to
discuss the proper approach.353
In discussing the proper approach, the Utah Supreme Court completely
rejected the neutral criteria approach, “both as a briefing requirement and as a
rigid analytical method.”354 The court discussed its position regarding raising

347
See Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819 (Wyo. 1897); In re MacDonald, 33 P. 18, 20–21 (Wyo.
1893); supra notes 64–120 and accompanying text.
348
See Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 47, 390 P.3d
728, 744 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 40, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065–66
(Wyo. 2004)).
349
See Keiter, supra note 2, at XXV, 29; supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text; see also
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 26 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1933).
350
See also Tiedemann, 2007 UT ¶ 32–37, 162 P.3d at 1113–15 (discussing the “proper
approach to state constitutional law development”); Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶¶ 11–13, 171
P.3d 525, 530–31 (Wyo. 2007) (undergoing a truly independent constitutional analysis after citing
the relevant constitutional text and case law); Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d
158 (Wyo. 1992) (same).

See Tiedemann, 2007 UT ¶ 32–37, 162 P.3d at 1112–15. (Durham, J., majority); see also
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 623 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring) (acknowledging Utah
Supreme Court Justice Christine Durham as a leader in state constitutional law issues).
351

352
See Tiedemann, 2007 UT ¶ 32, 162 P.3d at 1112–13 (quoting and citing Soc’y of
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993)).

Id. The Court asserted the independence of its state constitutional analysis stating “[t]his
court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah’s
constitutional guarantees . . . . Furthermore, it is part of the inherent logic of federalism that state
law be interpreted independently and prior to consideration of federal questions.” Id. ¶ 33, 162 P.3d
at 1113 (citing Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 379, 383 – 84 (1980)); see also Sutton, supra note 22, at 178 – 81 (agreeing with Linde’s idea
that courts should independently consider state claims first).
353

354

Williams, supra note 7, at 177; see Tiedemann, 2007 UT ¶ 32–37, 162 P.3d at 1112–15.
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state constitutional claims and explained that mere mentions of the relevant
constitutional text are not enough, but claims may be acceptable when supported
by traditional methods of constitutional analysis.355 The court further suggested
that historical arguments can be helpful in constitutional analysis, but they
are not essential.356 Additionally, a litigant may point to flaws in the federal
analysis of a parallel rights provision to help reinforce their state constitutional
claim.357 Importantly, the court articulated an open approach to asserting state
constitutional claims, saying:
[A] claimant could rely on nothing more than plain language
to make an argument for a construction of a Utah provision
that would be different from the interpretation the federal courts
have given similar language. Independent analysis must begin
with the constitutional text and rely on whatever assistance
legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process. There
is no presumption that federal construction of similar language
is correct.358
The Utah Supreme Court’s standard for raising state constitutional claims is
a prime example of an open standard focused on substance, not form.359 The
Wyoming Supreme Court should adopt a similar standard for independent
constitutional analysis.360
The Wyoming Supreme Court and litigants both possess the tools necessary for such independent state constitutional interpretation.361 The Court long
ago established several principles of statutory construction in Rasmussen v. Baker,
which it has continuously applied to the Wyoming Constitution.362 The Court
also expressed more interpretive principles in cases like Neely v. Wyoming
Commission on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, where it analyzed the Declaration of

355

Tiedemann, 2007 UT ¶ 37, 162 P.2d at 1114 (citations omitted).

356

Id.

357

See id. ¶ 37, 162 P.3d at 1114–15.

358

Id. ¶ 37, 162 P.3d at 1115.

359

See id. ¶¶ 32–37, 1112–15.

See id.; supra notes 64 –114, 143 –52, 262–71 and accompanying text. Wyoming does have
case law applying this type of approach. See generally Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, 171 P.3d 525
(Wyo. 2007) (undergoing an independent constitutional analysis similar to that in Tiedemann);
Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992) (same).
360

361
See supra notes 64 –114 and accompanying text; see also Mecklenburg, supra note 215, at
73 (stating “the history of search-and-seizure in Wyoming provides ample basis for a doctrine that
is adequately grounded in state law”).

See supra notes 64 –76 and accompanying text. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated in
more recent years it has “followed faithfully” these interpretive principles. See Mgmt. Council of
Wyo. Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1998).
362
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Rights in pari materia.363 Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court has said the
Wyoming Constitution is a living document and it has interpreted provisions
within the Declaration of Rights with this principle in mind.364 The Court
has further used the notion that natural rights are enshrined in the Wyoming
Constitution as a source of authority to draw from when interpreting the
Declaration of Rights.365 Thus, the Court has established the necessary tools to
independently and adequately interpret the Wyoming Constitution.366
In our federal system, it is the Wyoming Supreme Court’s duty to give
meaning to the text of the Wyoming Constitution’s Declaration of Rights and
to fulfill its role as the guarantor of individual liberties.367 The Court’s position
as the final interpreter of the Wyoming Constitution, the supreme law of the
state, makes the Court autonomous on issues of state constitutional law.368 As
part of that autonomy, the Wyoming Supreme Court holds an “interpretive
responsibility” when undergoing an independent state constitutional analysis.369
The Court’s interpretive responsibility requires it to “offer[] a compelling account
of the rights in question, an account that may or may not dovetail with the
federal understanding.”370 The Wyoming Supreme Court has, in many instances,
refused to address a state constitutional claim, explaining how it is not the Court’s

See Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 47, 390 P.3d
728, 744 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 40, 88 P.3d 1050, 1065–66
(Wyo. 2004)).
363

See, e.g., Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, ¶ 17 n.4, 32 P.3d 313, 318 n.4 (Wyo.
2001); Johnson v. State Hearing Exam’r’s Office, 838 P.2d 158, 181 (Wyo. 1992) (discussing the
“penumbra of protections provided by the Wyoming Constitution”); State v. McAdams, 714 P.2d
1236, 1237 (Wyo. 1986); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 26 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1933); see
also supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
364

See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text; see also Wyo. Const. pmbl.; Keiter, supra
note 2, at 62.
365

366

See supra notes 64–114, 262–71 and accompanying text.

See Sutton, supra note 22 at 170 (discussing one of the virtues of federalism as “having two
sets of court systems tasked with enforcing two sets of constitutional guarantees independently”);
Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 643 (“When a state court fails to independently evaluate its state
constitution, it deprives the people of the double security the nation’s founding fathers intended to
provide.”); supra notes 22–23, 113 and accompanying text
367

See Williams, supra note 7, at 176 (citation omitted); see also Keiter, supra note 2, at
109 (“The Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently recognized the U.S. Supreme Court is the
final interpreter of the U.S. Constitution and that its rulings are binding on the state’s courts. At
the same time, the court has noted that the federal constitutional rights recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court are minimal, and it is free too enlarge upon these rights when interpreting the state
constitution.” (citing Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v.
Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1985)).
368

369
See Williams, supra note 7, at 176. (citation omitted); see also Utter & Pitler, supra note
22, at 656 (“[S]tate courts have equal responsibility for independently interpreting their state
constitutions; a textual difference simply makes it easier for a court to see its responsibility.”).
370

Williams, supra note 7, at 176 (quotation and citation omitted).
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function to frame and present an appellant’s argument for them.371 But it is the
Court’s interpretive responsibility to give meaning to the rights provisions within
the Wyoming Constitution.372 By declining to even address state constitutional
claims because appellants do not satisfy a rigid analytic form, the Court shifts
its responsibility onto litigants and thus fails to share the “equal responsibility”
for independently interpreting the Wyoming Constitution.373 As Justice Blume
expressed in State v. Langley, the “[c]ourts must be, and are, whether willingly
or not, the ultimate arbiters as to whether or not there is, in a particular case, an
unwarranted invasion of [our] guaranteed rights . . . .”374 Therefore, it is up to the
Wyoming Supreme Court, not just litigants, to give meaning to the Declaration
of Rights.375
The Wyoming Supreme Court should accept state constitutional claims
which, at a minimum, include a discussion of the relevant text of the right
the litigant has asserted, which follow traditional principles of constitutional
interpretation, and which the litigant has supported with legitimate sources.376
Using this more open standard for asserting state constitutional claims would
allow more litigants to adequately raise claims, provide the Court an opportunity
to more fully develop an independent constitutional jurisprudence, and breathe
more life into the Wyoming Declaration of Rights.377

VI. Conclusion
The Wyoming Supreme Court has had a “strong jurisprudential tradition.”378
Early on, the Court established principles for interpreting the Wyoming
Constitution that it still uses today.379 It has also analyzed the rights protections
afforded to Wyoming citizens independently of federal rights protections, though
in varying degrees.380 The Court also addressed the resurgent interest in state

See Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 132, 137 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring)); supra notes 140– 42,
161– 65, 252–54, 272–90, 294 and accompanying text.
371

See Williams, supra note 7, at 176 (citation omitted); supra notes 367–370 and
accompanying text; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 656.
372

373

See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 656.

374

See State v. Langley, 84 P.2d 767, 771 (Wyo. 1938) (emphasis added).

375

See id.; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 22, at 656.

376

See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 37, 162 P.3d 1106, 1115 (Utah 2007).

See id. ¶ 37,162 P.3d at 1114 –15; Keiter, supra note 2, at 29–32 (discussing the Wyoming
Constitution and the history of how the Wyoming Supreme Court has given meaning to this
“evolutionary document”).
377

378

Keiter, supra note 2, at 29.

379

See supra notes 64–89 and accompanying text.

380

See supra notes 90–113 and accompanying text.
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constitutional law that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s.381 In addressing
the resurgent interest in state constitutions, the Court in Saldana and Vasquez
adopted a “precise, analytically sound” approach combined with a neutral criteria
approach as a form of argument for litigants to use when raising independent
state constitutional claims.382 The Court calls this form of argument the Saldana
factors.383 In practice, the Court has used the Saldana factors to limit state
constitutional claims by declining to address litigants’ arguments which do not
adhere to the Court’s preferred analytic form.384 Despite recent cases elaborating
on what is required of litigants to adequately raise an independent state
constitutional claim, it remains unclear what an adequate claim looks like under
the Court’s current approach.385 Additionally, when a state constitutional claim is
adequately raised, the focus of the analysis revolves around deviating from federal
precedent interpreting the Federal Constitution rather than on elaborating upon
a substantive analysis of the Wyoming Constitution.386 Because of this relational
focus on the Federal Constitution, Wyoming’s jurisprudence inherently lacks
truly independent constitutional analysis.387
The Wyoming Supreme Court should reject the Saldana factors and adopt a
more open standard for accepting independent state constitutional claims.388 The
Court should address a state constitutional claim under the Declaration of Rights
if a litigant, at a minimum, includes a discussion of the relevant text of the right
asserted, uses traditional principles of constitutional interpretation, and supports
the discussion with legitimate sources.389 In conjunction with this new standard,
the Court should analyze the state constitutional claim before it moves on to any
analysis of a parallel federal right.390 Under this method of analysis, the Court
and litigants should be able to develop a new tradition of truly independent state
constitutional jurisprudence.391 Ultimately, the duty is on judges, lawyers, and

381

See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.

See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo.
1993); supra notes 121–97 and accompanying text.
382

383

See supra notes 170 –72 and accompanying text.

384

See supra notes 174, 205, 246, 294 and accompanying text.

See Sheesley v. State, 2019 WY 32, 437 P.3d 830 (Wyo. 2019); supra notes 205–15,
272–95 and accompanying text.
385

386

See supra notes 305–21 and accompanying text.

387

See supra notes 305–21 and accompanying text.

388

See supra notes 296 –377 and accompanying text.

389

See supra notes 345–50, 358 and accompanying text.

390

See supra notes 208, 311–16, 345–50 and accompanying text.

391

See supra notes 358, 376–77 and accompanying text.
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litigants to contribute to the development of Wyoming’s constitutional law.392
Litigants’ ability to raise more state constitutional claims, independent from the
minimum protections of federal law, will give the Wyoming Supreme Court the
opportunity to make the Wyoming Constitution the “font of individual liberties”
the framers intended it to become.393

392
See Utter & Pitler, supra note 22 at 677 (“Each component of a state’s legal system—state
bar, law schools, and judiciary—bears a measure of responsibility for breathing life into a state
constitution.”); see also Keiter, supra note 2, at XXV (“With Wyoming’s small population, the
public as well as the state’s bar and judiciary enjoy unique opportunities to participate directly in an
ongoing dialogue over the scope and meaning of the state’s constitution’s manifold provisions.”).
393

See Brennan, supra note 7, at 491; supra notes 22–23, 345–77 and accompanying text.
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